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Preface 
 
 
 
After the failed attempt in Seattle in late 1999, the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Doha, in November 2001, launched the agenda for a new compre-
hensive round of multilateral trade negotiations. This study provides insights into the 
economic effects of the new WTO Doha round for the Netherlands. It places the analysis 
for the Netherlands against the background of worldwide effects and effects for the Euro-
pean Union. With the next Ministerial Meeting of the WTO scheduled to take place in 
Cancun, Mexico, in November 2003, this study makes a timely contribution to the debate 
on further worldwide liberalization of trade.  
 The methodology used is comparable with trade policy analyses of the World Bank, 
the IMF, and the OECD, involving a similar quantitative modelling framework. The analy-
sis of specific economic consequences for the Netherlands, in the broader context of the 
European Union and worldwide effects, is a special feature of this study.  
 This study was prepared at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Directorate-General for foreign economic Relations. The authors benefited greatly from 
the discussions with the advisory committee, which consisted of: 
- Mr. Marko Bos, deputy director Economic Affairs, Social and Economic Council
 (SER ); 
- Dr. Arjan Lejour, senior researcher international affairs, Netherlands Bureau for Eco-
nomic Analysis (CPB); 
- Prof. Dr. Gerrit Meester, senior policy advisor international affairs, Ministry of Agri-
culture, Nature Management and Fisheries; 
- Mrs. Irma Keijzer, policy advisor agriculture, Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
 
 The discussions with the advisory committee provided a useful guidance for the re-
search team, which was led by Dr. Frank van Tongeren, LEI, and consisted of: Prof. Dr. 
Joseph Francois, Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, mr. Henk Kelholt, LEI and Dr. Hans van 
Meijl, LEI.  
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
This study provides insights into the nature and magnitude of the impacts of the WTO 
Doha Round for international trade and the related welfare improvements. The methodol-
ogy used is comparable with recent trade policy analyses of the World Bank, the IMF, the 
OECD, involving a similar quantitative modelling framework. The analysis of specific 
economic consequences for the Netherlands is a special feature of this study. These effects 
at the national level are considered in the context of overall effects at the EU and world 
level.  
 For a proper comparison of the situation before and after the Doha Round, it is nec-
essary to account for the effects resulting from separate developments. Considerable 
attention was therefore given in the study to the development of a realistic 'baseline'. This 
baseline already takes into account events such as the entry of China into the WTO and the 
addition of new members to the EU. In this way it is possible to estimate those effects that 
are specifically attributable only to further trade liberalisation in the Doha Round. 
 No matter how complex, an economic model remains a necessary simplification of 
reality. Thus this model is heavily dominated by clearly quantifiable factors, such as re-
duced import tariffs. Non-quantitative trade restrictions, such as those facing the services 
sector, are usually not included in quantitative analyses. This carries the risk of underesti-
mating the importance of these less visible trade restrictions. For this reason, this study 
attempts to quantify the effects of both liberalising trade in services and reducing adminis-
trative barriers facing exporters and importers at border-crossings.  
 A review of the international tariff situation reveals that the specific modalities of 
tariff reductions are at least as important as the actual amount reduced. Reduction modali-
ties that target peak tariffs result in a different tariff landscape compared to more simple 
reductions in average tariffs. Furthermore, developing countries have a particular interest 
in reducing tariffs that currently hamper South-South trade. This results from the fact that 
many developing countries have maintained a high level of protection under the Uruguay 
Round.  
 The increase in global income from trade liberalization is estimated at between $210 
billion for partial liberalization to $670 billion for a full liberalization scenario.1 The analy-
sis underlines the importance of trade policy reform by developing countries for achieving 
these benefits. About one quarter of the global gains can only be realized if developing 
countries actively participate. At the same time, developing countries can achieve high 
gains relative to their current income levels. 
 A third of the estimated benefit of $210 to $670 billion is attributable to trade facili-
tation, a third to agricultural liberalization and the remaining third approximately equally 
                                                 
1 This compares to recent study from the IMF and the World Bank, which forecasts a welfare increase of 
$280 billion in the middle term and $650 billion in the long term. 
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to both reductions in industrial tariffs and liberalization in services. Leaving aside trade fa-
cilitation and services liberalization, industrialized countries have the most interest in 
seeing agricultural liberalization in other OECD economies as well as a reduction in indus-
trial tariffs by developing countries. For developing countries, the benefits arise primarily 
from trade liberalization with other developing countries, especially in manufactured 
goods. 
 The results for the agricultural sector are mixed: net benefits at a global level, with 
particularly the EU, Africa and the majority of Asia profiting, but potentially negative ef-
fects in the long-term for the Asia-Pacific region and North America. This is a striking 
results that seems at odds with the current positions taken in the agricultural negotiations. 
However, the results highlight the importance of taking a long-term structural view, includ-
ing effects beyond agriculture. CAIRNS group countries should perhaps be cautious about 
expecting long-term economy-wide gains if, as a result of liberalization, the agricultural 
sector draws more resources away from other productive uses. Developing countries also 
need to think carefully about the risks of reinforcing an emphasis on primary exports with 
consequent de-industrialization. 
 The potential increase in world income from reducing agricultural import tariffs 
could reach $60 billion, but 60 percent of this is dependent on effective dismantling of 
market protection in developing countries. Additional reduction of internal agricultural 
support results in an economy-wide increase in income that is greater for the EU than for 
North America. Within Europe this is more relevant for France, Germany and Eastern 
Europe than for the Netherlands. Dutch agriculture, with its own particular specialisations, 
is less dependent on European production support than the typical agricultural sectors of 
other countries.  
 The worldwide results are consistently positive for the industrial sector, with regards 
to both short- and long-run effects. The benefits of reducing industrial tariffs, estimated at 
about $35 billion with partial liberalisation, and $55 billion with full liberalisation, are (es-
pecially in the long term) greater than those for the agricultural sector due to the relatively 
larger investment spending released in the industrial sector.  
 The readiness of developing countries to reduce effectively their own tariffs is cru-
cial to realizing prospective worldwide benefits in this area. While many developing 
countries engaged in significant liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, many of these coun-
tries still maintain tariffs at relatively high (albeit reduced) levels. The wide gap between 
bound and applied tariff rates limits the bargaining power of developing countries and 
means that the debate as to which tariffs (bound, applied, or historic) to use as the refer-
ence point in market access negotiations is particularly important. A noteworthy exception 
in the general pattern of results is China, which is found to meet stiffer competition from 
other developing countries, with its export prices under consequently pressure. These re-
sults highlight the critical role that determination of market access modalities (including 
benchmark or base negotiating rates) will play in securing benefits for developing coun-
tries. 
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Impacts on the Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands, being a very trade-oriented economy, could enjoy a disproportionate 
share of world welfare gains. With further liberalization, national income would be about 2 
percent higher over the long term. An important part of the Dutch economy, including the 
transport and food processing sectors, benefits from greater trade flows. Relevant tariffs 
facing Dutch exporters are on average higher than the protection granted to them on EU 
markets. Breaking down tariff barriers provides these exporters with relatively large export 
opportunities. 
 Dutch output would expand particularly in the food processing and the transport and 
logistics sectors. The higher than average growth in exports in transport services reflects 
the general dependence of the Dutch economy on the size of international trade flows. On 
the other hand, the Dutch manufacturing sectors, in particular the metal and electrotechni-
cal industry, will face stiff competition from Asia. Asian producers can benefit from a 
growing domestic market and also from growing export market that enables them to 
achieve more cost-effective scales of production.  
 A noteworthy result is that the study does not point to any general vulnerability of 
the Dutch agricultural sector to trade liberalization within the WTO. Sectors that are heav-
ily dependent on European agricultural subsidies, such as grain and beef production, do not 
occupy a major share of the Dutch agri-food sector. In some other agricultural sectors, such 
as dairy (certainly with the lifting of production quotas), there is even room for expansion. 
Reform of the European sugar regime will almost certainly lead to diminished production 
in the Netherlands but sugar remains a possibility for crop diversification if grains become 
less attractive due to falling prices. The results confirm the comparative advantage of the 
Netherlands in agriculture, food processing and transport and the large dependence of the 
Dutch economy on international trade. 
 Despite the dominance of services in the Dutch GDP (accounting for about three 
quarters of GDP), the preliminary estimates indicate that liberalization would have a rela-
tively limited impact on this sector, certainly in comparison to a region such as North 
America. The projected export growth rates in services are positive, and their contribution 
to the trade balance rises. However, the predominantly national orientation, combined with 
a low share of international trade, yields only a minor impact on domestic production. 
 In this regard, it should be noted that the analysis is restricted to the cross-border 
trade effects of liberalization in services while potentially considerable benefits from 
Dutch foreign investment are not incorporated fully.  
 12
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
After the failed attempt in Seattle in late 1999, the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Doha, in November 2001 launched the agenda for a new compre-
hensive round of multilateral trade negotiations. The ministerial declaration emphasizes 
that his new round provides a major opportunity for developing countries. Consequently 
the agenda for new WTO round has been coined the 'Doha Development Agenda'. 
 This study provides insights into the economic effects of the new WTO Doha round 
for the Netherlands. It places the analysis for the Netherlands against the background of 
worldwide effects and effects for the European Union.  
 The study provides insights into the nature and magnitude of the impacts of the WTO 
Doha Round for international trade and the resulting welfare improvements. The method-
ology used is comparable with recent trade policy analyses of the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the OECD, involving a similar quantitative modelling framework. The analysis of spe-
cific economic consequences for the Netherlands is a special feature of this study. These 
effects at national level are considered in the context of overall effects at EU and world 
levels. The study covers the areas of agricultural liberalization, liberalization in industrial 
tariffs and liberalization in services trade.  
 No matter how complex, an economic model remains a necessary simplification of 
reality. Thus this model is heavily dominated by clearly quantifiable factors, such as re-
duced import tariffs and reduced export subsidies. Non-quantitative trade restrictions, such 
as those facing the services sector, are usually not included in quantitative analyses. This 
carries the risk of underestimating the importance of these less visible trade restrictions. 
For this reason, this study attempts to quantify the effects of both liberalizing trade in ser-
vices and reducing administrative barriers facing exporters and importers at border-
crossings. 
 The report is organized as follows: Chapter two provides a background on the impor-
tance of trade for the Dutch economy. A picture of the global policy landscape follows in 
chapter three. This chapter also develops the liberalization scenarios for the subsequent 
quantitative analysis. Chapter four describes briefly the modelling framework used. Chap-
ter five discusses the results of our liberalization scenarios. It starts with a section on global 
results, proceeding with the results for the EU and finally discussing the estimated impact 
on the Netherlands. 
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2. Dutch foreign trade 
 
 
 
2.1 Composition of trade 
 
The Dutch economy is open to foreign trade. Like many small countries its ratio of trade to 
GDP is high. Because of greater variety in goods produced domestically, big countries 
with a large domestic market, in general, can exploit scale economies and they can exploit 
a wider range of available resources. Smaller countries rely on trade to enable them to 
benefit from their comparative advantage. In The Netherlands, the value of imports repre-
sents 56% of GDP, which stands in stark contrast to its large neighbour Germany, where 
this indicator is just 26% (Table 3.1). The Netherlands is also a net exporting country, with 
exports representing 62% of GDP. The high import and export ratio highlights also the 
'mainport' feature of The Netherlands, which serves as a distribution centre for the popu-
lous European hinterland. This important part of the Dutch economy can be expected to 
benefit from an expansion of global trade volumes in the wake of further trade liberalisa-
tion. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Trade openness 
 
  Exports/ GDP (%) Imports/ GDP (%)
Netherlands 62 56
France 26 23
Germany  27 26
Rest EU15 32 32
Rest OECD 16 16
Developing countries 25 27
Rest of World 30 30
Source: GTAP v5 database. Calculations LEI 
 
 
 It is essential for small economies to specialise in the production of a relatively nar-
row product range in order to import a large variety of foreign goods. The Netherlands is 
traditionally specialised in exports of products in the petro-chemical complex and the agri-
food complex. The production factors 'sea location' and 'soil and climate' have in the past 
stimulated the growth of the transport sector, agriculture and food processing. The growth 
of the petrochemical complex has also been stimulated by the sea location which provided 
good access to raw materials, but this can only be a partial explanation of their success. 
Those capital-intensive processing industries depend also on the exploitation of economies 
of scale and the availability of skilled labour. With a small domestic market, economies of 
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scale can only be realised if the market is expanded and a significant portion of production 
is exported.  
 Scale economies play also a dominant role in the development of basic metal indus-
tries and aluminium industries. In contrast, industries such as electrotechnical and small 
scale manufacturing sectors are more dependent on technological progress and a diversi-
fied and highly skilled labour base. Although these sectors are not very capital intensive in 
production, they often require substantial R&D investments to develop new and diversified 
product niches. These sunk costs can only be recuperated if the product market is large 
enough. 
 A partial picture of Dutch foreign trade is provided in Figure 2.1. With the exception 
of some agricultural exports, especially cut flowers, tomatoes and pork products, which 
have a large contribution to the countries' net exports, most products that rank high on the 
exports also register high import values. For agricultural primary products the explanation 
can be found in the specialisation pattern following traditional arguments. Location spe-
cific factors, combined with external scale economies that can be realized horticultural 
clusters have spurred the growth of horticultural products, such as greenhouse vegetables 
and cut flowers. Likewise, intensive livestock farming does not depend on the scarce pro-
duction factor land, and has benefited from the cheap availability of imported feedstuff 
(e.g. tapioca and soya meals).  
 The simultaneous occurrence of large export and import figures outside primary ag-
riculture can be attributed to two factors, both of which are partial explanations. First, at 
the level of aggregation used here, we will observe some intra-industry trade. With product 
differentiation and firm specific scale economies the production of each variety of the 
same product tends to be concentrated in one particular country. If consumers have ac-
quired a taste for variety, the whole range of varieties will be in demand, and each country 
simultaneously imports and exports some part of the variety spectrum. (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1989). 
Second, an important issue for The Netherlands is re-exports, as recently highlighted by 
the Central Planning Bureau. According to CPB (2001, 2002b), re-exports1 have soared in 
the 1990s to account for an impressive 40% of total Dutch exports in 2000. In 1990 the es-
timated share of re-exports was just 20%. The feature of the Dutch economy as an 'entrepot 
economy' is realized by international distribution centres which distribute goods from 
America and Asia to the Northern European hinterland.  
 This function of The Netherlands as a logistics and distribution centre points towards 
potential gains from worldwide trade liberalisation. The Dutch transport and logistics sec-
tor can benefit from an expansion of global trade volumes, which can be the result of 
further trade liberalisation. 
 
                                                 
1 Re-exports are traded goods that are transported through the Netherlands without further significant indus-
trial processing. In order to be accounted as re-exports, the ownership of goods has to be transferred to a 
Dutch resident. Without such transfer of ownership, the good would be classified as transit good, which is not 
included in the National Accounts. For further discussion of technical matters, please refer to CPB (2001).  
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The European hinterland dominates the structure of Dutch exports. More than 75% of ex-
ports find their way to European destinations, as highlighted in Table 2.2. While the 
regional structure of exports has been quite stable over time, the structure of imports has 
changed notably during the 1990s. An increasing share of imports is sourced from the Far 
East, where especially, the P.R. China, Taiwan and South Korea have witnessed impres-
sive growth rates (from €14 billion in 1996 to €41 billion in 2001). Imports from 
developing countries have also risen during the 1990s.  
 The portion of Dutch exports destined for European markets is even larger for those 
products that are re-exported to a large extent. A good example is 'office equipment and 
computers', which account for one quarter of total re-exports, but hardly register domesti-
cally produced exports. Another example is tropical fruit juices, which are imported in 
large quantities through Rotterdam harbour, but the bulk of it is again exported to Euro-
pean destinations. Re-exports occur mainly in those products where the Netherlands does 
not have an obvious comparative advantage.  
 
 
Table 2.2 Source and destination of trade in goods 
 
 Regional structure of Dutch exports (%) 
 1996  1998 2000 2001 
Total 100  100 100 100 
European Union 77  76 75 77 
USA 3  4 4 4 
Far East (Japan, S.E. 
Asia, Taiwan) 
5  4 5 4 
Rest of World 14  16 16 15 
 Regional structure of Dutch imports (%)  
 1996  1998 2000 2001 
Total 100  100 100 100 
European Union 63  60 54 54 
USA 8  9 9 9 
Far East (Japan, S.E. 
Asia, Taiwan) 
13  16 18 19 
Rest of World 16  15 17 18 
Source: CBS, International Trade Statistics 2001, calculations LEI. 
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Table 2.3 Structure of commodity exports by product group, 2000 (%) 
 
% Domestically prduced goods Re-exports Total exports
Agriculture and food 27 6 19
Chemicals 23 14 19
Machinery, electronic equipment and transport 
equipment 27 65 43
of which: office equipment and computers 1 25 11
Other goods 23 15 19
Total 100 100 100
Source: CPB (2001), calculations LEI. 
 
 
2.2 Revealed comparative advantage 
 
Identifying those products that perform well in the international competition can give some 
indication as to which products and sectors might gain from a multilateral lowering of 
trade barriers. On the other hand, identifying products in which The Netherlands does not 
have a comparative advantage will help to flag tougher international competition in the 
face of lowering import protection.  
 One measure that helps to identify the competitive strength of a country is the so-
called 'Revealed Comparative Advantage Index' (RCA) (Balassa, 1965). This index shows 
if an exported commodity performs above the average Dutch export product in terms of 
world market shares. If the product has a large world market share -adjusted for the total 
participation if Dutch exports in world trade- than the product is said to reveal a compara-
tive advantage.1  
 The RCA index can be criticized in various grounds. For example, it does not take 
product differentiation and intra-industry trade into account. Another disadvantage of this 
indicator in the Dutch context is that it only takes exports into consideration and does not 
account for import penetration. The fact that a substantial portion of Dutch exports is re-
exports should be taken into account in this type of analysis. By supplementing the RCA 
with the ratio of exports to imports gives a better picture of the strengths and weaknesses, 
but is obviously still incomplete. If the RCA is high, but the ratio of exports to imports 
low, it is an indication that this product is mainly re-exported or product differentiation 
features are significant. Nevertheless the RCA supplemented with the export/import ratio 
can provide a useful guideline to assess export performance. Figure 2.2 displays a grouping 
of commodities according to their RCAs and export values. The data represent averages for 
the period 1993 and use the full list of 261 products from the UNCTAD trade statistics. 
The commodities shown represent 80% of the total export value in each quadrant of the ta-
ble, and provide a very complete picture.  
                                                 
1 The RCA for good i from the Netherlands is defined as: [(export good i, NL)/(world exports good i) ]/ [total 
exports NL)/ (world exports)] * 100 
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The picture emerging from this 'roadmap' confirms the observations made earlier. Products 
with a revealed comparative advantage and whose exports are mostly domestically pro-
duced (the North-East corner of the table) are predominantly in certain agricultural 
products, food processing and in petro-chemicals. The analysis also reconfirms for the 
more recent period of observation the findings by van Hulst and Soete (1989) who carried 
out a similar exercise at a more aggregate level and at during the mid-1980s. Ottens (2001) 
has conducted a similar study but at a more aggregate level and covering data up to 1996.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Schematic classification of traded products  
 
 Export/import <1 Export/import >1 
RCA > 
100 
Revealed comparative advantage, but ex-
ports dependent on imports. Little added 
value and/or large re-exports 
 
Revealed comparative advantage and mainly 
indigenous products 
 
RCA < 
100 
Revealed comparative disadvantage. Net 
import product 
 
Revealed comparative disadvantage and 
mainly indigenous products 
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2.3 Import protection and export barriers  
 
The trade openness of the Netherlands seems to be underscored by low (trade weighted) 
average applied import tariffs in Figure 2.3. However, this is also due to the large share of 
intra-EU trade, which is duty free. On average, the level of protection that Dutch firms en-
counter on their export markets is higher than the barriers imposed on imports into the 
Netherlands. Broadly speaking, this points to a potential Dutch interest in improved market 
access. The global protection landscape is more elaborately described in chapter three. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Applied trade protection 
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Source: GTAP v5 database, calculations LEI. 
 
 
2.4 Services 
 
Trade in services has received a growing attention in recent years, and stands firmly on the 
Doha agenda. Structural changes in developed market economies naturally lead to an in-
creasing share of services in GDP. In OECD countries, services typically represent 60-70% 
of GDP (OECD, 2001), and in The Netherlands this percentage is even as high as 75% (in-
cluding publicly provided services, such as education and health care). Even in the lowest 
income countries, services account for more than a third of GDP. Economists have ob-
served that the demand for services is relatively highly income elastic, and productivity 
growth lags behind productivity growth in agriculture and manufacturing (Baumol et al., 
1989). As incomes grow, and people become richer their demand for services expands 
more rapidly than their demand for food products and manufacturing goods. Although ser-
vices represent an increasing share in the economy and in international trade, services 
sectors operate predominantly at the national level, and are typically less traded interna-
tionally.  
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Within the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS), WTO members have made 
agreements to liberalize trade in services. The main aspect of these agreements is that 
countries promise to grant national treatment to foreign service providers in certain sectors. 
An important aspect of trade in services is the fact that it is broader than trans-boundary 
supply, as in the case of trade in goods. In the services sectors, one speaks of international 
trade if the supplier (or buyer) crosses the border. A case in point is international tourism, 
where the consumer of the service typically crosses the border to enjoy the service in an-
other country. But also direct foreign investment (FDI) is often involved, in which case the 
supplier of service crosses the border. The GATS distinguishes four modes of supply.1 The 
European Commission (2002) provides a concise summary of the state of play in the ser-
vices negotiations. Information on trade protection in services is even less readily available 
from statistical sources than protection information for agriculture and manufactures. In 
our subsequent modelling exercise we provide estimates trade protection in services trade 
and estimates of the effects of reducing these barriers.  
 The thin borderline between trade and foreign investment in the case of services also 
hampers statistical analysis of trade in services. Only recently has the Dutch Statistical of-
fice (CBS) started a joint initiative with the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) to provide 
improved estimates of trade in services. These new estimates reveal that the international 
distribution function of the the Netherlands is gaining weight in the economy. Between 
1995-1999 the export of services has risen faster that exports of goods. Exports of services 
has risen 48% while exports of goods has increased by 23%. (CBS, 2002). Transport ser-
vices have contributed the largest share to the rising services exports. 
 However, despite impressive growth rates, services are still less traded internation-
ally than goods. Estimates in Table 2.5 show that the ratio of services exports to output 
equals about 11% in 1999, while the economy-wide average is about 20%. Within services, 
transport services take the lead with a share of more than 40% of the export value. This is 
followed by business services, such as insurance, financial services and computer- and ICT 
services. Also included in this category are royalty and license fee receipts. In total ser-
vices represent about one fifth of trade values. 
 The geographical composition of trade in services is comparable to the composition 
of trade in goods, but compared to goods closer trade links exist with the USA. According 
to data from DNB, the USA absorbs 15% of total services exports from The Netherlands 
and it supplies 16% of services imports. As in goods trade, the largest share goes to other 
European countries, with Germany being the most important trading partner, followed by 
France.  
                                                 
1 Mode 1: cross border supply (e.g. banking services supplied via e-mail); Mode 2: consumption abroad (e.g. 
tourism); Mode 3: commercial presence (e.g. foreign branch of a bank); Mode 4: presence of natural persons 
(e.g. non-national employees of foreign bank branch) 
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Table 2.5 Dutch services trade 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
(as % of output
value 1999)(*)
 Services exports 
Transport&Trade 16724 19920 20320 21340 19%
Business 13479 16672 17205 20097 13%
Other private and public 6967 7942 8929 9007 4%
Total exports 37170 44534 46454 50444 11%
(as % of total goods &  
services exports) 20% 21% 21% 22% 
      
 Services imports 
Transport&Trade 11976 13827 15322 15855 14%
Business 13003 16104 15279 19089 12%
Other private and public 10141 10850 12552 11640 6%
Total imports 35121 40781 43152 46583 10%
Source: DNB, note: (*) output value calculated from Input Output table 1999 
 
 
Table 2.6 Geographical composition of services trade 1999 
 
 Exports (% of total) Imports (% of total)
World 100 100
EU15 58 59
Germany 17 14
UK 14 16
France 5 7
CEECs 2 2
USA 15 16
Asia 11 8
South America 1 1
Source: DNB, calculations LEI 
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3. Trade Liberalization Scenarios 
 
 
 
The core of our analysis is structured around a set of scenarios. These scenarios are based 
on alternative liberalization approaches for agriculture, manufactured goods, and services 
trade. They are meant to illustrate the implications of alternative approaches to market ac-
cess liberalization. They are stylised rather than exact representations. In part, this is 
because we are working with an aggregate model (i.e. we do not model trade at the 6-digit 
HS level), and as such detailed treatment of all product-specific proposals is simply impos-
sible. In addition, the actual market access modalities remain to be worked out. In 
agriculture, domestic support may or may not be affected, developing countries may or 
may not have to liberalize, and certain politically sensitive sectors may yet again escape 
from meaningful liberalization. Our scenarios are themselves decomposed into different 
components, related to specific sets of countries and specific sectors and instruments. This 
offers the advantage of allowing us (or the reader) to construct rough representations of 
hybrid liberalization experiments later, since individual components can be taken from dif-
ferent scenarios and combined.1 
 
 
3.1 The Policy Landscape  
 
Tariff negotiations in the GATT/WTO have generally been based on tariff bindings, or 
schedules of concessions tabled under GATT rules, and the coverage and level of these 
bindings is an important element of the initial conditions for the negotiations. Table 3.1 
provides information on the share of industrial-product tariffs (on a trade-weighted basis) 
that remains either unbound or bound above applied rates. While tariffs in the OECD (and 
Latin America) are generally bound, many Asian and African economy tariffs remain un-
bound despite more than a four-fold increase in the coverage of developing-country tariff 
bindings in the Uruguay Round (Abreu 1996). For almost all developing countries, existing 
bindings are, on average, well above applied rates, reflecting a combination of relatively 
high initial bindings, and the subsequent wave of reductions in applied rates. (See Black-
hurst et al 1996, Francois 2001). 
 In addition to general Uruguay Round commitments, there have also been efforts for 
sector-based commitments to implement zero tariffs (called 'zero-for-zero'). This is re-
flected in the next-to-last column of Table 3.1. As a result of zero-for-zero efforts, OECD 
                                                 
1 Technically, decomposition of general equilibrium-related effects of policy scenarios exhibits path depend-
ence, meaning that the decomposition can be sensitive to the ordering of the elements of the experiment set. 
The impact of a particular instrument is also sensitive to the other members of the set. We employ a linear 
decomposition method here that does not exhibit path dependence (Harrison et al 2000). As such, individual 
experiment elements are roughly additive.  
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economies have between roughly 10% and 30% of tariff lines bound at zero percent. Most 
developing countries have opted out of this process. Zero-for-zero increased developed 
country duty-free imports to 43% of total imports (Laird 1998). The process itself ground 
to a halt after the initial Information Technology Agreement (ITA). This seems to have 
been for two reasons: (i) the sectors in which OECD economies could easily reach agree-
ment had already been included, and (ii) those sectors remaining involve North-South 
issues not susceptible to this approach. In other words, the cherries have been picked, leav-
ing us with the hard nuts.  
 With the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, average ad valorem tar-
iffs in the industrial countries generally are around 3 percent. This is reflected in the first 
columns of Table 3.2. However, there are important exceptions. One of these is textiles and 
clothing, where the average rate is roughly three times this average. This is reflected in the 
standard deviation and maximum tariff columns. With full implementation of current 
commitments, we estimate a simple average industrial tariff in the United States of 3.2 per-
cent, a standard deviation of 4.3, and a maximum tariff of 37.5 percent. The European 
Union has a higher average, but less dispersion. (The EU has an average of 3.7 percent, a 
standard deviation of 3.6 percent, and a maximum tariff of 17 percent. For the developing 
countries in Table 3.1, average industrial tariffs range from a low of 3 to 4 percent to a 
high of more than 20 percent. Table 3.2 presents detailed data for three developing coun-
tries: Brazil, India, and Thailand. These countries span the spectrum of developing country 
bindings as reflected in Table 3.1. Brazil's tariffs are all bound, though the average rate for 
industrial products is 14.9 percentage points above the current applied rate. This gap is 
called a 'binding overhang'. India and Thailand's tariffs are partially covered by bindings, 
again with significant binding overhang. In general, for developing countries, binding 
overhang is large enough that reductions in the range of 50% are necessary to force reduc-
tions in average applied rates for countries like Brazil. For many countries, even this will 
have little for no effect, as tariffs are largely unbound. For example, note that one-third of 
India's manufacturing tariffs and 90 percent of Sri Lanka's tariffs are unbound. Of course, 
this limits severely the negotiating leverage of developing countries in the WTO. This is 
also why the debate of using bound, applied, or 'historic' rates as a starting point is impor-
tant. 
 As in the case of industrial tariffs, the stage for any future agriculture negotiations 
was also set by the Uruguay Round outcome- this time by the Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture (URAA). One key difference from industrial products is that essentially all 
agricultural tariffs are bound. However, in both industrial and developing countries, there 
is a large degree of binding overhang resulting from 'dirty tariffication' or the use of 'ceil-
ing bindings' (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). The next round of agricultural negotiations was 
scheduled in the URAA, while the negotiating parameters (tariffs, tariff-rate-quota levels, 
subsidy commitments, etc.) must also be viewed in the context of the schedules of URAA 
commitments. The system that has emerged is complex and similar to arrangements in the 
textile and clothing sectors, featuring a mix of bilaterally allocated tariff-rate-quotas (with 
associated quota rents) and tariffs. Viewed in conjunction with industrial protection, the 
basic pattern is that the industrial countries protect agriculture and processed food, while 
protection in developing countries is more balanced (though also higher overall) in its fo-
cus on food and non-food manufactured goods.  
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The URAA had a stated goal of no backsliding and modest liberalization. However, nego-
tiating parties (generally the relevant agriculture ministries) gave considerable leeway to 
themselves with regard to selection of the appropriate reference period from which to 
measure export subsidy reductions. In addition, the move to a price-based system for pro-
tection has, in many cases, been subsumed into an effective adoption of explicit quotas. 
The disciplines on domestic subsidies have also been weakened by a relatively soft defini-
tion of the AMS vis-à-vis individual subsidies and the scope for reallocation of 
expenditures within the AMS. (See Tangermann 1998 for discussion) Commitments not to 
erode current market access were meant to limit the scope for increased protection through 
dirty tariffication. As the name implies, dirty tariffication involved violations of the spirit, 
if not the letter, of the URAA text. It involved setting tariff bindings at rates far above then 
current effective protection rates. The practice of setting high bindings complicated the 
problem of measuring the impact of further commitments to reduce bindings. Basically, in 
agriculture, we are in a world that allows scope for great policy discretion and uncertainty 
as a result of the loose nature of the commitments made. In addition, the setting of high 
bound rates made possible the conversion of NTBs into even more restrictive import tar-
iffs. This in turn made quantity disciplines necessary to avoid backsliding. Despite the 
goals of subsidy reductions and a shift toward price-based border measures, one of the 
more striking features of the regime that has actually emerged is the prominent role that 
quantity measures have taken in the new architecture. Basically, the agricultural trading 
system is complicated and still evolving. Policy measurement in this area has converged on 
the use of price-based measurements that emphasize the tax/subsidy equivalent of policy. 
(As this approach reflects available data, this is the approach we employ in this study as 
well.)  
 For services, 'market access' is a problematic concept. From the outset, service nego-
tiations have been 'qualitative.' They have not targeted numeric measures, but rather 
commitments in the cross-border movement of consumers and providers and the estab-
lishment of foreign providers. In fact, the GATS actually confuses FDI with international 
trade. As a result, efforts to quantify market access in service sectors (a basic requirement 
if we want to then quantify liberalization) have been problematic at best. The standard ap-
proach (an example is Hoekman 1995) has been to produce inventory measures. 
 As an alternative perspective, we follow Francois (2001) and have produced esti-
mates of 'tariff equivalents' for services trade. These are based on a simple simple gravity 
model, estimated from detailed global trade data for services trade in 1997. The basic ap-
proach is described in the annex to this report. The resulting estimates are summarized in 
Table 3.3. The estimates are admittedly crude. The pattern that emerges is consistent with 
that for industrial tariffs. It appears that barriers to services trade are higher (often much 
higher) in developing countries than in the OECD. Hence, as in the case of industrial tar-
iffs, the effects of further GATS negotiations will hinge critically on developing country 
participation or non-participation, and the extent to which they commit to actual liberaliza-
tion rather than stand-stills (the qualitative equivalent of ceiling bindings). 
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3.2 Trading costs 
 
With the reduction in traditional trade barriers, attention in the regional and multilateral 
trade arenas has not only shifted to quantity restrictions, but also to trade facilitation meas-
ures. These are meant to target less transparent trade barriers, such as customs procedures, 
product standards and conformance certifications, licensing requirements, and related ad-
ministrative sources of trading costs. Studies of regional integration initiatives (Baldwin 
and Francois 1997, Smith and Venables 1988) have emphasized the potential for liberaliza-
tion initiatives to substantially reduce such barriers. Conceptually, these costs are different 
from the price and quantity measures used for manufactures and agriculture. They are a 
pure global deadweight loss. 
 The estimates of trading costs are very rough (at best). Nonetheless, they provide 
some sense of the magnitudes involved. An overview of estimates is provided in Table 3.4. 
In the context of the EC single market program, elimination of internal customs procedures 
and related administrative streamlining were projected to reduced trading costs by up to 2 
percent of the value of trade (EC 1988). Globally, UNCTAD (1994) has noted that trading 
costs represent 7 to 10 percent of the cost of delivered goods. Like the EC, UNCTAD also 
estimates that simple trade facilitation measures could reduce these costs by 2 percent of 
the value of trade. The Australian Industry Commission (1995) has estimated potentially 
higher savings in the context of APEC, ranging from 5 to 10 percent of the value of trade. 
Under more modest facilitation initiatives, the Japanese Economic Planning Agency 
(1997) has estimated savings at 2 percent in an APEC context, while Francois (2001) has 
employed a similar range of estimates. 
 
 
3.3 Policy scenarios 
 
To bring these elements together, we define three sets of scenarios (See, Table 3.5). The 
first two are partial liberalization scenarios. In the 'Linear 50%' all trade instruments are 
reduced by 50%. This involves a 50% reduction in agricultural and industrial tariffs and 
export subsidies, a 50% reduction in OECD domestic support for agriculture, a 50% reduc-
tion in the tariff-equivalent of services barriers, and a partial reduction in trading costs, 
related to trade facilitation measures. Services liberalization involves a 50% or a full reduc-
tion in the barriers shown in Table 3.3. The second partial liberalization experiment is 
called the 'Swiss formula' experiment. In this experiment the reduction in import tariffs in 
agriculture and manufacture is based on a straight Swiss formula with a coefficient of 0.25, 
meaning the maximum tariff is reduced to 25%. (See Francois and Martin forthcoming). 
The third scenario simply involves full elimination of all trade barriers. Trade facilitation, 
based on the range of available estimates, is assumed to range between 1.5 percent of the 
value of trade (partial liberalization) and 3 percent (full liberalization).  
 Each experiment is decomposed, both in terms of sectors and instruments, and also in 
terms of country grouping. An example is given in Table 3.6 were the world welfare effect 
(equivalent variation) is decomposed across sectoral instruments and regions. Because of 
the decomposition method used, this means that the reader can pick and choose, combining 
the results of hybrid experiments involving elements from different experiments, for a 
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rough sense of possible effects. For example, if in the next WTO round, the outcome will 
be only 50% liberalization in manufactures in all regions and trade facilitation only in 
OECD countries, the world welfare effect will be approximately $80 billion ($34 billion 
due to liberalization in manufacturing and $46 billion due to trade facilitation in the 
OECD). 
 Finally, for each of the experiments we can choose between certain model features 
(these model features are discussed in more detail in section 4.2). First, we can study short-
run versus long-run effects. In the short run capital is fixed and in the long run capital can 
adjust (Baldwin closure). Second, we can assume perfect competition versus imperfect 
competition in the manufacturing and services sectors. With perfect competition we as-
sume constant returns to scale and with imperfect competition we assume monopolistic 
competition with increasing returns to scale. For the agricultural sectors (except for the 
food processing industry) we always assume constant returns to scale. In this study we use 
the constant returns to scale scenario mainly as a benchmark scenario to assess the impact 
of the increasing returns to scale features and it facilitates comparison with other studies 
that mainly use constant returns to scale in all sectors. 
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Table 3.1 Industrial tariff rates and bindings -- post UR and ITA 
 
 Percent of MFN imports that are subject to: Tariff lines  
 bound  
tariffs 
unbound 
tariffs 
tariffs 
bound 
above ap-
plied rates 
tariffs un-
bound or 
bound 
above ap-
plied rates 
Share of 
bound duty 
free tariff 
lines to total 
tar. lines 
Total tariff lines 
Argentina 100.0 0.0 99.9 99.9 0.0 10530
Australia 96.9 3.1 31.7 34.8 17.7 5520
Brazil 100.0 0.0 91.0 91.0 0.5 10860
Canada 99.8 0.2 45.7 45.9 34.5 6261
Chile 100.0 0.0 99.7 99.7 0.0 5055
Colombia 100.0 0.0 97.7 97.7 0.0 6145
El Salvador 97.1 2.9 96.0 98.9 0.0 4922
European Union 100.0 0.0 17.7 17.7 26.9 7635
Hungary 93.6 6.4 3.3 9.7 10.4 5896
India 69.3 30.7 14.8 45.5 0.0 4354
Indonesia 92.3 7.7 86.6 94.3 0.0 7735
Japan 95.9 4.1 0.1 4.2 47.4 7339
Korea 89.8 10.2 3.4 13.6 11.6 8882
Malaysia 79.3 20.7 31.0 51.7 1.6 10832
México 100.0 0.0 98.4 98.4 0.0 11255
New Zealand 100.0 0.0 46.5 46.5 39.5 5894
Norway 100.0 0.0 36.5 36.5 46.6 5326
Peru 100.0 0.0 98.5 98.5 0.0 4545
Phillipines 67.4 32.6 15.5 48.1 0.0 5387
Poland 92.8 7.2 44.6 51.8 2.2 4354
Singapore 36.5 63.5 11.7 75.2 15.2 4963
Sri Lanka 9.2 90.8 1.4 92.2 0.1 5933
Thailand 67.4 32.6 8.9 41.5 0.0 5244
Tunisia 67.9 32.1 41.5 73.6 0.0 5087
Turkey 49.3 50.7 0.0 50.7 1.4 15479
United States 100.0 0.0 14.0 14.0 39.4 7872
Uruguay 100.0 0.0 96.3 96.3 0.0 10530
Venezuela 100.0 0.0 90.3 90.3 0.0 5974
Zimbabwe 13.6 86.4 3.9 90.3 3.0 1929
   
Source: Francois (2001), based on WTO and World Bank data on Uruguay Round and post-Information 
Technology Agreement schedules. 
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Table 3.3 Estimated Services Trade Barriers (percent trade cost equivalents) 
 
Label Region Trade 
Transport and  
logistics 
Business  
services 
Other  
services 
NLD Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FRA France 12.3 12.1 18.3 19.2 
DEU Germany 0.0 13.7 9.5 0.0 
REU15 Rest of EU 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CEEC CEECs 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MED Mediterannean and Middle East 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NAM North America 0.0 22.6 1.2 16.0 
SAM South America 13.8 10.4 8.6 5.9 
CHINA China 0.0 14.5 37.4 3.7 
INDIA India 61.3 63.9 32.1 62.2 
HINCAS High income asia 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand 0.0 2.3 9.5 15.2 
SAF South Africs 28.3 17.5 32.8 22.6 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ROW Rest of World 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Based on gravity equation estimates.     
 
 
Table 3.4 Estimated Cost Saving Froms Trade Facilitation  
 
European Commission (1992) In the context of the Single Market program, savings may 
amount to 1.6 percent to 1.7 percent of the value of trade 
due to savings on administrative costs 
 
UNCTAD (1994) costs of transactions represent 7 to 10% of the value of 
trade. Trade facilitation could reduce this to 5% to 8%. 
 
Australian Industry Commission (1995) trade facilitation may save 5% to 10% of the total value of 
trade, through reduced transaction costs, in the APEC con-
text. 
 
Japan EPA (1997) A 'modest' APEC initiative may lead to 2% savings (as a 
share of the value of trade) due to reduced transaction costs. 
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Table 3.5 Scenario definitions 
 
Instruments Linear 50% Swiss formula Full liberalisation 
Import tariffs in agriculture 
and manufacturing  50% reduction 
Swiss formula reduction 
(with a max 25% tariff) 100% reduction 
Estimated border measures in 
services 50% reduction 50% reduction 100% reduction 
Export subsidies 50% reduction 50% reduction 100% reduction 
Domestic agricultural support 
in OECD countries 50% reduction 50% reduction  100% reduction  
Trade facilitation 
1.5% of value of 
trade 1.5% of value of trade 3% of value of trade 
 
 
Table 3.6 Total welfare gains of linear 50% experiment decomposed by sectoral instruments and re-
gions 
 
  OECD LDCs Interaction
effects
Total
Agricultural liberalization (border measures) 24482 32446  56928
Agricultural liberalization (domestic support) 8744   8744
Manufactures      (border measures) 12057 22230  34287
Services liberalization 
 
17225 6907  24132
Trade facilitation 
 
46159 26152  72311
Interaction effects 
 
  15974
Total 
 
108667 87735 15974 212376
Source model simulations 
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4. The Model and Data 
 
 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the global computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model used in this study. The model is characterized by an input-output structure (based on 
regional and national input-output tables) that explicitly links industries in a value added 
chain from primary goods, over continuously higher stages of intermediate processing, to 
the final assembling of goods and services for consumption. Inter-sectoral linkages are di-
rect, like the input of steel in the production of transport equipment, and indirect, via 
intermediate use in other sectors. The model captures these linkages by modelling firms' 
use of factors and intermediate inputs. The most important aspects of the model can be 
summarized as follows: (i) it covers all world trade and production; (ii) it allows for scale 
economies and imperfect competition; (iii) it includes intermediate linkages between sec-
tors; (iv) and it allows for trade to affect capital stocks through investment effects. The last 
point means we model medium to long-run investment effects. The inclusion of scale 
economies and imperfect competition implies agglomeration effects like those emphasized 
in the recent economic geography literature.  
 
 
4.1 Model Data 
 
The data come from a number of sources. Data on production and trade are based on na-
tional social accounting data linked through trade flows (see Reinert and Roland-Holst 
1997). These social accounting data are drawn directly from the most recent version of the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset, version 5.2. (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
2002). The GTAP version 5 dataset is benchmarked to 1997, and includes detailed national 
input-output, trade, and final demand structures. The basic social accounting and trade data 
are supplemented with trade policy data, including additional data on tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers.  
 The data on tariffs are taken from the WTO's integrated database, with supplemental 
information from the World Bank's recent assessment of detailed pre- and post-Uruguay 
Round tariff schedules and from the UNCTAD/World Bank WITS dataset. All of this tariff 
information has been concorded to GTAP model sectors. Services trade barriers are based 
on the estimates described in chapter three and the technical annex. We also work with the 
schedule of China accession commitments (Francois and Spinanger 2001). 
 While the basic GTAP dataset is benchmarked to 1997, and reflects applied tariffs 
actually in place in 1997, we of course want to work with a representation of a post-
Uruguay Round world. We also want to include the accession of China, the enlargement of 
the EU, and Adenda 2000 reforms as part of the baseline. To accomplish this, before con-
ducting any policy experiments we first run a 'pre-experiment' in which we do the 
following: 
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- implement the rest of the Uruguay Round tariff commitments; 
- implement the ATC phaseout; 
- implement China's accession to the WTO; 
- implement Agenda 2000; 
- and implement the EU enlargement. 
 
 As such, the dataset we work with for actual experiments is a representation of a no-
tional world economy (with values in 1997 dollars) wherein we have realized many of the 
trade policy reforms already programmed for the next few years. 
 The social accounting data have been aggregated to 17 sectors and 16 regions. The 
sectors and regions for the 17x16 aggregation of the data are given in Table 4.1 (a more de-
tailed mapping between the aggregated sectors and regions and the original GTAP regions 
and sectors is given in technical annex Table 5). 
 
 
Table 4.1 Sectors and regions 
 
Label Region   Label Sector 
NLD Netherlands   CERE* Cerals 
FRA France   HORT* Horticulture & other crops 
DEU Germany   SUGA* Sugar, plants and processed 
REU15 Rest of EU   INTLIV* Intensive livestock &products 
CEEC CEECs   CATLE* Cattle & beef products 
MED Mediterannean and Middle East   DAIRY* Milk & dairy 
NAM North America   OAGR* Other agriculture 
SAM South America   PROCF Processed food products 
CHINA China   TEXT Textiles, leather & clothing 
INDIA India   EXTR Extraction industries 
HINCAS High income asia   CHEM Petro & chemicals 
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific   MELE Metal and electotechnical ind 
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand   OIND Other industries 
SAF South Africs   TRAD Trade services 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa   TRAN Transport services 
ROW Rest of World   BSVC 
Business, financial & communni-
cations services 
      OSVC Other private and public services 
         
* denotes a competitive sector 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical structure 
 
We turn next to the basic theoretical features of the model. More discussion is provided in 
the separate technical annex. In all regions there is a single representative, composite 
household in each region, with expenditures allocated over personal consumption and sav-
ings (future consumption). The composite household owns endowments of the factors of 
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production and receives income by selling them to firms. It also receives income from tar-
iff revenue and rents accruing from import/export quota licenses (when applicable). Part of 
the income is distributed as subsidy payments to some sectors, primarily in agriculture.  
 On the production side, in all sectors, firms employ domestic production factors 
(capital, labour and land) and intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources to 
produce outputs in the most cost-efficient way that technology allow. Perfect competition 
is assumed in the agricultural sectors as indicated in Table 4.1 (notice that the processed 
food products sector is characterized by increasing returns to scale). In these sectors, prod-
ucts from different regions are assumed to be imperfect substitutes in accordance with the 
so-called 'Armington' assumption. Production under imperfect competition is discussed be-
low.  
 Prices on goods and factors adjust until all markets are simultaneously in (general) 
equilibrium. This means that we solve for equilibria in which all markets clear. While we 
model changes in gross trade flows, we do not model changes in net international capital 
flows. Rather our capital market closure involves fixed net capital inflows and outflows. 
(This does not preclude changes in gross capital flows). To summarize, factor markets are 
competitive, and labour and capital are mobile between sectors but not between regions. 
 We model manufacturing and services as involving imperfect competition. The ap-
proach followed involves monopolistic competition. Monopolistic competition involves 
scale economies that are internal to each firm, depending on its own production level. In 
particular, based on estimates of price-cost markups (see the annex), we model the sector 
as being characterized by Chamberlinian large-group monopolistic competition. (For more 
on this approach, see Francois and Nelson 2002.) An important property of the monopolis-
tic competition model is that increased specialization at intermediate stages of production 
yields returns due to specialization, where the sector as a whole becomes more productive 
the broader the range of specialized inputs. These gains spill over through two-way trade in 
specialized intermediate goods. With these spillovers, trade liberalization can lead to 
global scale effects related to specialization. With international scale economies, regional 
welfare effects depend on a mix of efficiency effects, global scale effects, and terms-of-
trade effects (for more on this, see Francois and Roland-Holst 1997). Similar gains follow 
from consumer good specialization.  
 Another important feature involves a dynamic link, whereby the static or direct in-
come effects of trade liberalization induce shifts in the regional pattern of savings and 
investment. These effects have been explored extensively in the trade literature, and relate 
to classical models of capital accumulation and growth, rather than to endogenous growth 
mechanisms. Research in this area includes Baldwin and Francois (1999), Smith (1976, 
1977), and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1980). Several studies of the Uruguay Round have 
also incorporated variations on this mechanism. Such effects compound initial output wel-
fare effects over the medium-run, and can magnify income gains or losses. How much 
these 'accumulation effects' will supplement static effects depends on a number of factors, 
including the marginal product of capital and underlying savings behaviour. In the present 
application, we work with a classical savings-investment mechanism (discussed briefly in 
the appendix, and also in Francois et al 1997). This means we model long-run linkages be-
tween changes in income, savings, and investment. The results reported here therefore 
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include changes in the capital stock, and the medium- to long-run implications of such 
changes.  
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5. Results 
 
 
 
5.1 Global effects  
 
We now turn to the results of the experiments outlines in chapter two. Tables 5.1 to 5.4 
present a summary of results at the global level. The tables present a breakdown of the na-
tional income effects (technically measured as equivalent variation) resulting from the 
various policy experiments along the lines of major sector components. Table 5.1 is fo-
cused on agriculture, Table 5.2 is focused on manufactures, Tables 5.3 is focused on 
services liberalization, and Table 5.4 focuses on trade facilitation. The Tables also give a 
breakdown of the effects of scale economies, through a comparison of a perfect competi-
tion version of the model to the one with scale economies and imperfect competition. We 
consider the increasing returns case to be the most relevant, and unless indicated otherwise, 
the discussion of results pertains to this version of the model. A different breakdown of na-
tional income effects is provided in a separate Annex, which also provides details on the 
'Swiss formula' results.  
 From the initial set of income effect tables, we can see that agricultural liberalization 
offers a mixed set of results. Liberalization of domestic support in the OECD, on the other 
hand, is generally positive for the OECD, though with negative consequences for sub-
Saharan Africa. We find that significant, though limited, liberalization yields positive re-
sults globally, and regionally for Europe, Africa, and most of Asia. However, on net 
agricultural liberalization is a mixed-bag, with gains in most areas from elimination of do-
mestic support, but with more mixed results from the elimination of border measures. 
Static results are consistently positive if constant returns to scale (CRS) are assumed, but 
induced changes in investment, combined with the imperfect competition features of the 
model, point to negative effects over the longer-run. 
Specifically, we find unexpected welfare effects from agricultural liberalisation in the fol-
lowing cases:  
- Australia and New Zealand, who are both net agricultural exporters, and are gener-
ally favouring agricultural liberalization. Those countries are usually expected to 
gain from improved market access in other countries.  
- Mediterranean countries who are close to the EU and are usually expected to gain 
from liberalization in the heavily protected EU agricultural markets. 
- Other non-OECD countries (India, China, South Africa, SSA) who do not liberalize 
themselves and loose when their access to OECD markets is improved. 
- Gains for South America are very limited. As a big agricultural exporter, they are 
generally expected to gain more from liberalization.  
 
 In order to understand these unexpected results it is important to distinguish the stan-
dard perfect competition and CRS case, which most other studies use, from our modelling 
of industrial sectors as exhibiting imperfect competition and IRS.  
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For almost all regions the explanation of the negative welfare results under imperfect com-
petition is straightforward: Due to trade liberalization in agriculture their agricultural 
sectors expand, because they gain by getting better access to OECD markets. However, the 
agricultural sectors are all perfectly competitive sectors with constant returns to scale. The 
expanding agricultural sectors draw resources from industrial sectors. As a consequence, 
the industrial sectors have to contract, which has negative implications for welfare because 
they cannot achieve cost effective scales of production. Therefore, the unexpected negative 
welfare effects are due to the presence of scale economies in some parts of the economy. 
This is a general point: If liberalization leads to specialization and expansion of CRS sec-
tors, this is often inferior compared to a policy-induced expansion in IRS sectors. In the 
latter case, the traditional gains from liberalization are magnified by additional opportuni-
ties to utilize economies of scale.  
 Our results highlight the importance of taking a long-term structural view. CAIRNS 
group countries should perhaps be cautious about expecting long-term economy-wide 
gains if, as a result of liberalization, the agricultural sector draws more resources away 
from other productive uses. Developing countries also need to think carefully about the 
risks of reinforcing an emphasis on primary exports. 
 The pattern for manufacturing liberalization is more consistent and positive, both in 
the initial static results, and over the long-term. From Table 5.2, the most important area 
for manufacturing tariff liberalization is the developing countries. Recall from the discus-
sion in chapter three that OECD tariffs are, on average, below 3 percent for manufacturing. 
As a result, the impact of a Swiss-formula (which targets high tariffs) yields only limited 
effects on the OECD, while directly proportional cuts have a more dramatic effect. At the 
extreme, we identify between an initial (static) effect of between $35 and $55 billion. The 
one region consistently, and significantly, hurt by significant manufacturing liberalization 
is China. This follows from an erosion of its terms of trade, driven by its growth in textile 
exports, combined with increased competition from other low wage countries (see the ex-
port effects in the annex tables). Natural competitors, such as India, currently limit their 
participation on world markets through a mix of import and export barriers. Rationalization 
in this area by developing countries leads to heightened competition against China in a 
number of sectors, with the result being income losses for China driven almost entirely by 
manufacturing and agricultural liberalization in the developing world.  
 Another important source of gains is services, which yields static income gains on a 
par with remaining manufacturing tariffs, ranging, potentially, to over $50 billion globally. 
One obvious winner from services liberalization is the United States, which is projected to 
pick up a substantial share of total gains. Another big winner in services, however, is 
somewhat less obvious. India, which has moved in recent years to become a major exporter 
in services (including software and back office services) is projected to be a bigger poten-
tial winner from services liberalization than North America. In fact, as a share of GDP, 
services is a more important source of gains for India than agriculture and manufacturing 
liberalization combined. The other important source of gains for India (and for much of the 
world) is trade facilitation. In the Asia-Pacific region, where exports alone are often 50 
percent of GDP, trade facilitation yields a dramatic short-run effects as well as a long-run 
impact driven by investment effects (Table 5.4) For the Asia-Pacific developing countries, 
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the single most important issue is trade facilitation, particularly by other developing coun-
tries. 
 Further detail on labour market and trade effects is provided in the annex tables. In 
general, both unskilled and skilled workers gain from the partial and full liberalization sce-
narios in most regions, except for some cases in the CEEC economies and China. In China, 
the results are linked to the trade and income effects following from competition with other 
low-wag exporters, as discussed above. The general pattern of wage effects is summarized 
in Figure 5.1, which shows percent changes in wages for unskilled workers in all regions, 
under all three scenarios. While this figure is somewhat difficult to read in detail, the basic 
pattern is clear - positive wage effects everywhere, under all scenarios, except for China in 
all cases and the CEECs in some cases. 
 The general pattern of export effects, reported in detail in the annex tables, is sum-
marized in Figure 5.2. Like the Figure 5.2, the emphasis here is not on individual values, 
but the general pattern of results. Export growth, under all scenarios, is greatest in the de-
veloping countries, especially in Asia and the Pacific (including India and China), but also 
in the Mediterranean, African, and Latin American economies. The CEECs suffer from 
trade-erosion with respect to market access to the EU15 economies. 
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Figure 5.1 
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Figure 5.2 
 
Exports, percent change
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5.2 Results for the (enlarged) European Union 
 
The European Union is a customs union, with a common external tariff against supplies 
from third countries, and practically zero tariffs within the union. Lower external trade bar-
riers affect producers and consumers in member states in two related ways. First there is 
the direct boost to competition on home markets through improved market access for sup-
pliers from outside the European Union. Second, the relative position of suppliers within 
the EU might change. The formation of the EU customs union leads, by definition, to trade 
preferences amongst the members of the free trade area. As a consequence the share of 
trade that is within the EU (intra-EU trade) is typically biased upward, and trade within the 
EU is larger than might be expected on the basis of geographic proximity and other trade 
promoting factors alone. With the recent eastward enlargement the preferences are ex-
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tended from the current 15 EU members to the new member states.1 Recall that the 
enlargement process has been incorporated in our baseline scenario. 
 The lowering of external trade barriers by the EU will inevitably lead to the erosion 
of the intra-EU trade preferences. Suppliers with lower cost will be able to enter the EU 
markets once the tariff barriers have come down that currently shield domestic producers 
from foreign competition. Consequently, we can expect the current bias towards intra-EU 
trade to be reduced. Table 5.5 nicely illustrates this effect by breaking down the simulated 
change in EU27 import values for one of the more modest liberalisation scenarios. 
 The 2% growth in EU27 exports is small compared to the 12% growth in world 
trade. A first driver of this result is that EU countries mostly trade amongst themselves. 
The benefits from removing the intra-EU barriers have already been realised in the past 
and there are no additional gains for intra-EU trade in a new WTO round. A second driver 
of this result is the increased competition from non-EU countries on EU markets. Simu-
lated intra-EU27 trade shrinks by -6% as other suppliers enter the EU markets.  
 
 
Table 5.5 Percent change in value of bilateral exports (f.o.b.), linear 50% cuts (*) 
 
? from ? to EU27 LDCs Other Total exports
EU27 -6 21 13 2
(4)
LDCs 30 39 25 30
(38)
Other 12 26 8 14
(15)
Total imports 3 
(5) 
28 
(35) 
14
(15)
12
(15)
Source: Model simulations.  
Note: (*) Short run results with scale economies. Long run results in brackets. 
 
 
 The most impressive growth in markets share is realized by suppliers from LDCs, 
who are simulated to expand their exports to the EU by 30%, compared to the 12% in-
crease of imports from other developed countries.  
 Because there is no positive growth to be expected from intra-EU trade, European 
exports can only by increased by expansion in non-EU markets. Exports to LDCs grow 
with 21% and exports to the other regions grow with 13%. Although these growth figures 
are high, this is insufficient to significantly boost total exports as their weight in total EU27 
exports is limited. 
 LDCs obtain the highest growth in exports (30%). They are simulated to expand ex-
ports to all destinations, but the largest trade surge is observed for intra-LDC trade. Global 
trade creation in this experiment amounts to 12% in short run and 15% in long run. While 
the trade increase materialises already in the short run for the EU and other developed 
                                                 
1 Our simulations include all 12 accession candidates newcomers, i.e. we also include Bulgaria and Romania, 
although these two countries will not enter the EU with the first wave of new member countries.  
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economies, LDCs see even larger growth in their exports in the longer term. Dynamic capi-
tal accumulation enables them to specialise more in exportable goods. 
 On balance, imports into the EU increase slightly faster than exports. What does this 
imply for individual industries in the European Union? A rise of imports in some highly 
protected sectors is to be expected. The pre-simulation landscape of import tariffs shows 
that the average import barriers for agricultural products (cereals, sugar, cattle, dairy and 
processed food) and textiles are the highest. Figure 5.3 shows that simulated imports rise as 
expected for these industries. The import growth for sugar and dairy is lower than might be 
expected on the basis of the initial import protection. This is caused by the output quota 
system, which limits the production decline as long as there are positive quota rents. The 
immediate impact of increased import competition is lower quota rents, and therefore 
lower internal EU prices. Production would only fall dramatically if quota rents were fully 
eroded, and this is not the case in our simulations. The lower internal prices make EU a 
less attractive export destination, and hence imports raise less than expected. 
 The pre-simulation landscape of import tariffs also shows that average barriers en-
countered on EU exports are sometimes higher than the barriers erected by the EU (Figure 
5.5). Hence, we can expect a growth of extra-EU exports to some destinations. Export 
growth may even occur for agricultural exports that are currently subject to export subsi-
dies, which we reduce in the liberalisation scenario.  
 Remarkable is the surge of trade in processed food. While it is consistent with recent 
empirical observations on the shifting composition of agri-food trade towards more trade in 
processed products (Hertel et al, 1999, Berkum and van Meijl, 2001), the explanation of 
this simulation result can be found in the data modelling assumptions.  
 Figure 5.5 shows that the average tariff on processed food in the EU27 equals a sig-
nificant 23% of the value of the product. But also processed food products exported from 
the EU have to climb an even higher barrier: 33%. Consequently, a simulated tariff reduc-
tion of 50% leads to a notable reduction of import prices, both in the EU as elsewhere. 
Another factor contributing to the expansion of trade is the assumption of scale economies 
in the processed food industry. Scale economies tend to promote more regional specialisa-
tion, and therefore they lead to more trade. As production is more concentrated in certain 
regions, rather than being spread out over diverse locations each serving a relatively nar-
row home market, more trade between regions will occur. An export-oriented region, with 
an existing specialisation in this sector can be expected to see food processing activities 
expanding. Within the EU this leads to the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent France, to 
expand in processed foods, while other EU regions see a slight contraction of the industry 
(Table 5.6). Other regions seeing an expanding food processing industry are South Amer-
ica and Australia-New Zealand. All these regions have already a comparative advantage in 
processed food (see Annex Table A-3, where the self-sufficiency indicator may be seen as 
an indicator of comparative advantage) and protection encountered on their exports is rela-
tively high (see Annex Tables A-1 and A-2). An expanding processed food sector 
stimulates both domestic production and imports of primary agriculture from LDCs.  
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Figure 5.5 Average import tariffs (%) on extra-EU trade (base situation) 
 
Source: GTAP database, author's calculations 
Note: Tariffs are given as trade-weighted averages of ad valorem tariff equivalents. 
 
 
 Trade (both exports and imports) between the EU and LDCs is growing relatively 
faster in our experiments than trade with developed countries. Already low trade barriers 
amongst OECD countries explain this. An interesting case is Textile and Clothing. Recall 
that our experiment assumes that MFA is already phased out (this is part of the baseline 
simulation), and the trade liberalisation experiment subsequently lowers the import tariffs 
on textiles and clothing. This greatly boosts exports from LDCs into the EU, and it crowds 
out the imports from developed economies.  
 The services industries are the only sub sector within the EU that does not see intra-
trade shrinking. Especially transport services display positive growth rates in wake of ris-
ing trade volumes. 
 The greater openness to imports and the opening of new export opportunities for 
products form the EU has some consequences for the development of output. These output 
developments are triggered on the one hand by trade developments induced by reduction in 
trade protection and, on the other hand, by the importance of international trade in sales. 
Only when a relatively large share of domestic production is exported, does export growth 
coincide with growth in production. Table 5.6 shows the percent change in output for the 
EU regions. As can be expected from the initial high protection on agricultural products, 
output developments for cereals are negative for all EU countries. Those EU members that 
rely heavily on imports and face heavy import competition, such as Germany, Rest EU15 
and especially the Netherlands (see self-sufficiency index in Annex table A-3), witness the 
highest reduction in production. Production in France is decreasing as it faces stiffer com-
petition on EU markets. For the Central and Eastern European countries production is 
almost unaltered because they are self-sufficient and an increase in trade does not change 
domestic production. The cattle and beef sector in the EU declines due to increased im-
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ports from especially South America and NAFTA. Production in the quota regulated dairy 
and sugar sectors does not change in the EU regions because production stays on quota and 
quota rents decline but remain positive. The development in production of processed food 
is explained before. The big net exporters within the EU, France and especially the Nether-
lands, increase output while output contracts in the other regions. 
 Textile production in the EU decreases due to increased import competition from 
China and India. This is especially affecting the only big net exporting textile producer 
within the enlarged EU, Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), whose produc-
tion declines with 36%. However, we have to be aware that the enlargement impact is 
already part of the baseline. During the enlargement process textile production in CEEC 
countries expanded rapidly, driven by increased exports to the EU15 countries. The new 
WTO round erodes the preferences associated wit EU membership reduces and therefore 
reverses the process. A similar observation could be made for textile and clothing imports 
from Turkey, which currently enjoys preferential access to EU markets. 
 
 
Table 5.6 Percent change output (volume index), linear 50% cuts  
 
 Netherlands France Germany Rest of EU15 CEEC candidate countries
Cereals -19 -10 -12 -12 2
Horticulture -1 4 4 4 2
Sugar 0 0 0 0 -4
Intensive livestock 1 2 -1 1 1
Cattle -2 -8 -5 -8 0
Dairy 0 0 0 0 3
Other agriculture 0 2 0 0 6
Processed foods 8 3 -3 -1 1
Textiles 7 -11 -24 -26 -36
Extraction -2 -3 -1 -2 6
Chemicals -2 0 -1 -1 2
Metal and elec -15 1 1 -1 454
Other industry -2 1 -2 0 47
Trade  0 0 0 0 3
Transport 18 1 0 5 17
Business serv 0 -1 0 0 4
Other services 0 0 0 0 3
Source: Model simulations.  
 
 
 For manufacturing and services, we simulate rather limited production responses 
within the EU. Small production effects are observed for trade services, business services 
and other services. Although these sectors obtain a positive growth in their exports, this 
does not significantly influence their production because these services are still predomi-
nantly operating at the national level. Their exports and imports form are a relatively small 
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share of production (Their self-sufficiency indicator equals about 1 for all services sectors 
in every EU region).  
 An exception is transport and logistics, where we observe notable production in-
creases within the EU due increased trade volumes. The transport and logistics sector 
facilitates the shipment and distribution of larger trade volumes. Production expands espe-
cially in the Netherlands.  
 Within manufacturing the only big change in production is in the Metal and electro 
technical industries, which contract in the Netherlands and expand in CEECs. One should 
not overestimate the effect in CEECs. The sector in the CEECs is very small and it partly 
recovers from the simulated production slump during the enlargement process. The case 
for the Netherlands will be explained in the next chapter. 
 
 
5.3 Results for the Netherlands 
 
Sectoral effects of liberalisation basically follow existing specialisation patterns, as dis-
cussed in chapter three. Changes in export values (Table 5.7) reveal that the processed 
foods industry and services are able to significantly expand their exports, while manufac-
turing industries and agriculture, except dairy, clearly experience tougher international 
competition. We have already elaborated in the previous section on the shrinking intra-EU 
trade, which accounts for about three quarters of Dutch exports. While the European inte-
gration has created preferential trade amongst EU members, this advantage is eroded in the 
process of multilateral trade liberalisation. However, the diversion effects are not large, 
since in general, OECD tariffs on manufactures have already come down to low levels dur-
ing the past decades, and current barriers on Dutch exports are already low. As a 
consequence of less trade with EU members, most products can only increase their exports 
by finding new markets outside the EU. The scope for such compensation is, however, lim-
ited to a few sectors and regions.  
 We find that export growth is a main driver for output growth in the following sec-
tors: 
- Processed food: the sector is highly dependent on exports and currently encounters 
relatively high barriers on its export markets. Hence lower barriers enable the sector 
to gain better access to export markets, which allows utilisation of returns to scale. 
- Transport services: the sector benefits from global trade expansion. It also benefits 
from lowering of currently high barriers in other countries. This provides improved 
access for Dutch companies in foreign markets.  
 
 Other sectors are not simulated to expand their production to a significant extent, or 
are even contracting (Figure 5.6 and table 5.9). This is explained by the current specialisa-
tion patterns as measured by the self-sufficiency index1 (Figure 5.7). Those products where 
The Netherlands imports a large share of domestic consumption, such as in the metal and 
                                                 
1 Self-sufficiency is defined as the ratio of domestic production over domestic absorption. 
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electrotechnical sector have a self-sufficiency ratio below one.1 Here, we observe an inten-
sified competition with foreign suppliers and an increase in imports as trade barriers into 
the EU are lowered. As Dutch firms find it more difficult to realize enough sales volumes 
within the EU, they have to contract output and they are less able to exploit economies of 
scale (Comparing the second and third column in Table 5.9 highlights the importance of 
scale economies). As a consequence, their average cost rise relative to international com-
petitors. This can be seen as a continuation of the trend of increasing imports from High 
Income Asia (Taiwan, South Korea), but also from the upcoming Asian economies, such as 
China and Vietnam. With lower external protection of the EU, the slight tariff advantage 
for Dutch producers on the EU market vanishes. This in turn, implies that Dutch producers 
in the metal and electrotechnical industries find it increasingly difficult to realize their 
economies of scale, and consequently their competitive position is eroding. To a lesser ex-
tent this reasoning also holds in the chemical industries, extraction - and other industries.  
 On the other hand, we have the processed food industry and transport services. These 
are clear net-export products, where self-sufficiency exceeds one, and which are able to 
expand production. In the processed food industries this is driven by export growth which 
materializes as barriers to Dutch exports come down. This enables the industry to expand 
production and to realize further scale economies. In the transport services, the main driver 
is expansion of trade volumes.  
 The middle ground is occupied by those sectors where the Netherlands is approxi-
mately self-sufficient in production, i.e. where trade does not play a large role. Here, we 
cannot expect a large impact from improved market access. The share of exports in sales is 
simply too low to yield a huge production impact from export growth. This is true a fortiori 
for services. While their simulated export growth rates are positive, and their contribution 
to the trade balance rises, the current low share of international trade yields only a minor 
impact on domestic production. For example, business services are simulated to expand 
their sales into South America and Asia Pacific, by respectively 4% and 5.5% in the case 
of a halving of trade barriers, but this is insufficient to compensate for the loss of sales into 
EU markets.  
 There is another factor that contributes to the limited export expansion in services, 
and indeed in other labour intensive sectors. Real wages in the Netherlands are simulated 
grow slightly faster under the liberalisation experiments than in the neighbouring countries. 
This is related to the great expansion of the food processing and transport sectors, which 
tend to absorb increasing amounts of labour. Consequently economy-wide wages and 
household incomes are simulated to rise. At the same time this positive income effect 
translates into slight price rises for the products of labour intensives sectors, such as ser-
vices. While the terms of trade improve, that is one unit of a commodity produced in The 
Netherlands earns more on the export market than before liberalisation, it becomes harder 
to compete internationally.  
                                                 
1 In chapter three we have discussed the issue of re-exports, which is an important phenomenon in Dutch in-
ternational trade. In our model re-exports are approximated by the share of imports that goes directly to the 
exporting industry. For example the share of MELE imports that is directly delivered to the Dutch MELE in-
dustry equals 80%. Apart from imports of machine parts these imports can be assumed be re-exported after 
minimal processing.  
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Figure 5.6 Simulated output effects, The Netherlands (% change, linear 50% cuts)  
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Figure 5.7 Self-sufficieny ratios, The Netherlands (base situation) 
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Note: self-sufficiency is defined as the ratio of domestic production over domestic absorption 
 
 
 It is often believed that trade liberalisation and limits to domestic agricultural support 
under WTO disciplines would threaten the agricultural sector in The Netherlands. The 
findings obtained from the simulations do not support such pessimism in general. In this 
regard, our findings are in line with a recent report by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture 
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Nature Management and Fisheries (Meester and Massink, 2002). The EU CAP is predomi-
nantly supporting agricultural activities that do not play an important role in the Dutch 
agri-food complex (cereals, oilseeds, beef). Indeed, our simulations show a decline in those 
sectors, in the wake of domestic liberalisation, but this decline is not dramatic. Dutch dairy 
producers appear to be still quota constraint, even in the radical liberalisation scenario. If 
the quota were removed, and if no environmental restrictions become binding, Dutch dairy 
production could grow in the long run. Even the heavily protected sugar crop remains to be 
profitably included in the cropping plan. With cereals becoming the less attractive crop, 
farmers are simulated to switch to sugar to some extent, in spite of quota rents to be re-
duced. This is not to say that the sugar trade balance will not deteriorate under the various 
scenarios. In fact, imports are rising significantly in all agricultural sectors, where import 
barriers are reduced the most. However, scale economies are less relevant in agricultural 
sectors and this tends to lead to smaller regional specialisation tendencies and output 
changes as compared to manufacturing sectors.  
 For the horticultural sector (food and non-food) we find that the deeper the liberalisa-
tion, and the longer the time perspective, the more positive are the growth prospects. Here, 
the effects are mainly of an indirect nature, since the trade barriers are already quite low.  
 Although not apparent from our discussion so far, the simulation results also indicate 
that the Dutch economy stands to gain from eastward enlargement of the EU. Since 
enlargement precedes the implementation of the next global trade liberalisation round, 
Dutch firms can take advantage of the trade preferences within the enlarged EU. A pro-
active stance will enable Dutch firms to create a foothold in a growing market.1 A similar 
conclusion is reached by CPB (2001c). 
 Static national income effects for the Netherlands can be substantial and range from 
1% to 2% of base GDP (roughly 4 to 7.5 billion USD per year), depending on the size of 
the cuts and assumptions on scale economies (Table 5.10). These income gains translate 
into substantial gains in the order of magnitude of several hundred euros per (current) 
Dutch household. The Netherlands benefits more from trade liberalisation than can be ex-
pected on the basis of its share in world GDP. In other words, its share in the global 
income gains (roughly 2%) exceeds its share in world GDP (1.2%). 
 The large contributors to this result are services liberalisation and trade facilitation. 
This is not surprising, since trade facilitation will tend to support the logistic and distribu-
tion function in The Netherlands. 
 
                                                 
1 Recall that our baseline simulation includes EU enlargement. In the baseline, Dutch exports to CEECs grow 
with double-digit figures in all sectors except cereals, sugar and textiles.  
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Table 5.10 National income effects, based on equivalent variation 
 
  
TOTAL as % of 
Global income 
effects 
TOTAL as % 
of base GDP 
TOTAL as 
dollar per 
household 
TOTAL as 
dollar per 
person 
TOTAL, 
USD mil. 
Short run, static IRTS 
Linear 50% cuts 1.8% 1.1% 572 245 3 889
Swiss formula cuts 1.7% 1.1% 556 238 3 779
Full liberalisation 1.9% 2.1% 1109 476 7 544
Source: model simulations.  
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Economic benefits of the Doha round for The Netherlands 
 
ANNEX: An Overview  of the Computational Model 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Introduction 
General structure 
Taxes and policy variables 
Trade and transport costs and services barriers 
Agricultural quotas 
Composite household demand 
Market structure 
Aggregation scheme 
 
1. Introduction 
This annex provides an overview of the basic structure of the global CGE model employed for 
our assessment of Doha Round-based multilateral trade liberalization. The model is implemented 
in GEMPACK -- a software package designed for solving large applied general equilibrium 
models.  The model is solved as an explicit non-linear system of equations, through techniques 
described by Harrison and Pearson (1994).  More information can be obtained at the following 
URL -- http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm. The reader is referred to Hertel (1996: 
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/model/Chap2.pdf) for a detailed discussion of the basic 
algebraic model structure represented by the GEMPACK code. While this appendix provides a 
broad overview of the model, detailed discussion of mathematical structure is limited to added 
features, beyond the standard GTAP structure. 
 The model is a standard multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, with 
important features related to the structure of competition (as described by Francois and Roland-
Holst 1997).  The capital accumulation mechanisms are described in Francois et al (1996b: 
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/techpapr/tp-7.htm), while imperfect competition features are 
described in detail in Francois (1998: http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/techpapr/tp-14.htm).  
Social accounting data are based on Version 5 of the GTAP dataset  (McDougal 2001), with an 
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update to reflect post-Uruguay Round protection, Agenda 2000, China’s accession to the WTO, 
and EU enlargement, as discussed in the body of the report.   
 
2. General structure 
The general conceptual structure of a regional economy in the model is represented in Annex 
Figure 1.  Within each region, firms produce output, employing land, labour, capital, and natural 
resources and combining these with intermediate inputs.  Firm output is purchased by 
consumers, government, the investment sector, and by other firms.  Firm output can also be sold 
for export.  Land is only employed in the agricultural sectors, while capital and labour (both 
skilled and unskilled) are mobile between all production sectors.  Capital is fully mobile within 
regions.   
All demand sources combine imports with domestic goods to produce a composite good, 
as indicated in the figure.  In constant returns sectors, these are Armington composites.  In 
increasing returns sectors, these are composites of firm-differentiated goods. Relevant 
substitution and trade elasticities are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
 
3. Taxes and policy variables 
Taxes are included in the theory of the model at several levels.  Production taxes are placed on 
intermediate or primary inputs, or on output.  Some trade taxes are modeled at the border. 
Additional internal taxes can be placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be 
applied at differential rates that discriminate against imports. Where relevant, taxes are also 
placed on exports, and on primary factor income.  Finally, where relevant (as indicated by social 
accounting data) taxes are placed on final consumption, and can be applied differentially to 
consumption of domestic and imported goods. 
Trade policy instruments are represented as import or export taxes/subsidies.  This 
includes applied most-favored nation (mfn) tariffs, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, 
price undertakings, export quotas, and other trade restrictions.  The two exceptions are service-
sector trading costs, which are discussed in the next section, and agricultural quotas, discussed in 
the subsequent section.  The full set of post-Uruguay Round tariff vectors is based on Francois 
and Strutt (1999) and Finger et al (1998).  This background paper includes a description of the 
methodology used to estimate post-Uruguay Round tariff rates.  Post-Uruguay Round protection 
in agriculture is taken from GTAP estimates.  The set of services trade barrier estimates is 
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described below.  Tariff rates for China’s accession to the WTO are taken from Francois and 
Spinanger (2001). 
4. Trade and transportation costs and services barriers 
International trade is modeled as a process that explicitly involves trading costs, which include 
both trade and transportation services.  These trading costs reflect the transaction costs involved 
in international trade, as well as the physical activity of transportation itself.  Those trading costs 
related to international movement of goods and related logistic services are met by composite 
services purchased from a global trade services sector, where the composite "international trade 
services" activity is produced as a Cobb-Douglas composite of regional exports of trade and 
transport service exports. Trade-cost margins are based on reconciled f.o.b. and c.i.f. trade data, 
as reported in version 5.2 of the GTAP dataset. 
A second form of trade costs is known in the literature as frictional trading costs.  These 
are implemented in the service sector.  They represent real resource costs associated with 
producing a service for sale in an export market instead of the domestic market.  Conceptually, 
we have implemented a linear transformation technology between domestic and export services.  
This technology is represented in Annex Figure 2.  The straight line AB indicates, given the 
resources necessary to produce a unit of services for the domestic market, the feasible amount 
that can instead be produced for export using those same resources.  If there are not frictional 
barriers to trade in services, this line has slope -1.  This free-trade case is represented by the line 
AC.  As we reduce trading costs, the linear transformation line converges on the free trade line, as 
indicated in the figure. 
The basic methodology for estimation of services barriers involves the estimation of 
sector-specific gravity equations, based on aggregate GTAP data (which reports detailed trading 
patterns in services) for total imports outside of intra-NAFTA and intra-EU trade.  These 
equations have been estimated at the level of aggregation corresponding to the sectors of our 
CGE model.   
The gravity equations are estimated using ordinary least squares with the following 
specification: 
 
(1) jjjjji EUaPOPaPCYaaM ε++++= 4321,  
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where Mi,j  represents imports in sector i by country j, PCYi represents per-capita income in the 
importing country, POPj is population, EUj is a dummy for EU countries, and ε is an error term. 
Deviations from predicted imports are taken as an indication of barriers to trade.  These tariff 
equivalent rates are then backed out from a constant elasticity import demand function as 
follows:    
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Here, T1 is the power of the tariff equivalent (1+t1 ) such that in free trade T0 =1, and [M1/M0] is 
the ratio of actual to predicted imports.  This is a reduced form, where actual prices and constant 
terms drop out because we take ratios.  The term e is the demand elasticity (taken to be the 
substitution elasticity from Annex Table 1). Regression results from this approach are reported 
in Annex Table 2, while the relevant estimates of tariff equivalents for the model sectors and 
regions are reported in Annex Table 3.   
 
5. Agricultural quotas 
An output quota places a restriction on the volume of production. If such a supply restriction is 
binding, it implies that consumers will pay a higher price than they would pay in case of an 
unrestricted interplay of demand and supply. A wedge is created between the prices that 
consumers pay, PM and the marginal cost for the producer, PS.  Annex Figure 3 below illustrates 
this point. The vertical distance between PM and PS at quota levels is known as the tax 
equivalent of the quota rent. Instead of applying a quota, an equivalent level of output taxation 
could be administered which has the same output reducing and price increasing effect. This is 
illustrated by the dashed line in the figure. The shaded area indicates the value of the quota rent: 
the wedge between consumer and producer prices times the level of output. It is an empirical 
matter to determine who is actually earning the quota rent. It represents income to someone in 
the economy, usually the holder of the quota right, though the rent distribution depends on the 
institutional set-up of quota allocation and tradability.  
In our model both the EU milk quota and the sugar quota are implemented at the national 
level. Technically, this is achieved by formulating the quota as a complementarity problem. This 
formulation allows for endogenous regime switches from a state when the output quota is 
binding to a state when the quota becomes non-binding. In addition, changes in the value of the 
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quota rent are endogenously determined. If τ denotes the tax equivalent of the quota rent, and 
)( qqY −=  denotes  the difference between the output quota q  and output q , then the 
complementary problem can be written as: 
  
(3) Y    0 ⊥≥τ  
 
where either     
τ > 0 and  Y = 0  the quota is binding  
or τ = 0 and Y ≥ 0  the quota is not binding 
 
Ignoring other tax and subsidy instruments that might be in place, the market price pm for 
commodities that are subject to a quota rent is  
 
(4) )1( τ+⋅= pspm  
 
where ps denotes the producer price, which equals marginal cost in the model. The value of the 
quota rent τ⋅ ps⋅ q is allocated as income to the regional household.   The modelling of this class 
of non-continuous policy instruments has been greatly facilitated by the latest release of 
GEMPACK.  
The effects of the quota, or the effect of a possible extension of quota rights, depend 
crucially on the size of the quota rent. For intra-EU distributional analysis it is also important to 
have estimates of the size of the quota rent at member state level. Such estimates are hard to 
obtain.  Our quota rent estimates are obtained form recent studies on the EU dairy sector and 
sugar sector. The rent estimates for dairy are obtained from Berkhout et al. (2002), Bouamra-
Mechemache et al. (2002) and Kleinhanss et al. (2002). The estimates for sugar have been 
obtained from Frandsen and Jensen (2002). For the Netherlands, the percentage increase of the 
market price above marginal productions cost, i.e. the tax equivalent of the quota rent, is 
estimated at 30% for milk. This is the highest figure within the EU and shows that Dutch dairy 
producers are very quota constrained. For sugar, France and Germany are most quota 
constrained, with rent estimates as high as 140%.  
We have also applied milk and sugar quota in the accession candidate countries (CEECs). 
At the time of writing the allocation of production quota to CEEC producers is still subject to 
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negotiations. We have followed the suggestions of the European Commission (2002) to allocate 
production quota to CEECs. For milk, the EC proposes allocations based on average deliveries 
for direct sales during the reference period 1997-99. For sugar, this amounts to allocation based 
on average production in the historic reference period 1995-1999. This quota allocation allows 
CEECS to expand their output slightly beyond current levels, i.e. the quota is currently not 
binding. But it would constrain them to attain the high output levels of the pre-reform period. 
 
6. The composite household and final demand structure  
Final demand is determined by an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas preference function, which allocates 
income in fixed shares to current consumption, investment, and government services. This yields 
a fixed savings rate. Government services are produced by a Leontief technology, with 
household/government transfers being endogenous. The lower-tier nest for current consumption 
is also specified as a Cobb-Douglas.  The regional capital markets adjust so that changes in 
savings match changes in regional investment expenditures.  (Note that the Cobb-Douglas 
demand function is a special case of the CDE demand function employed in the standard GTAP 
model code.  It is implemented through GEMPACK parameter files.) 
 
7. Market Structure 
7.1 Demand for imports: Armington sectors 
The basic structure of demand in constant returns sectors is Armington preferences.  In 
Armington sectors, goods are differentiated by country of origin, and the similarity of goods 
from different regions is measured by the elasticity of substitution.  Formally, within a particular 
region, we assume that demand goods from different regions are aggregated into a composite 
import according to the following CES function: 
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In equation (5), Mj,i,r is the quantity of Mj from region i consumed in region r.  The elasticity of 
substitution between varieties from different regions is then equal to σMj , where σMj=1/(1-ρj). 
Composite imports are combined with the domestic good qD in a second CES nest, yielding the 
Armington composite q.   
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(6) ( ) ( )[ ] jjj DrjrDjMrjrMjrj qqq βββ /1,,,,.., Ω+Ω=  
  
The elasticity of substitution between the domestic good and composite imports is then equal to 
σDj, where σDj=1/(1-β j). At the same time, from the first order conditions, the demand for import 
Mj,i,r can then be shown to equal  
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where EM j,r represents expenditures on imports in region r on the sector j Armington composite.   
In practice, the two nests can be collapsed, so that imports compete directly with each other and 
with the corresponding domestic product.  This implies that the substitution elasticities in 
equations (1) and (2) are equal.  (These elasticities are reported in Annex Table 1). 
 
7.2 Imperfect competition 
As indicated in Annex Table 1, we model manufacturing sectors and service sectors as being 
imperfectly competitive.  The approach we follow has been used in the Michigan and the WTO 
assessment of the Uruguay Round.  Recent model testing work indicates that this approach 
works “best” vis-à-vis Armington models, when tracked against actual trade patterns.  (See Fox 
1999, who uses the U.S.-Canada FTA as a natural experiment for model testing).   
Formally, within a region r, we assume that demand for differentiated intermediate 
products belonging to sector j can be derived from the following CES function, which is now 
indexed over firms or varieties instead of over regions.  We have 
 
(8) 
j
j
n
i
rijrijrj Xq
Γ
=
Γ 

= ∑
/1
1
,,,,, γ  
 
 
  
 
72
where γj,i,r  is the demand share preference parameter, Xj,i,r  is demand for variety i of product j in 
region r, and σj = 1/(1-Γj) is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the good.  
Note that we can interpret q as the output of a constant returns assembly process, where the 
resulting composite product enters consumption and/or production.   Equation (8) could 
therefore be interpreted as representing an assembly function embedded in the production 
technology of firms that use intermediates in production of final goods, and alternatively as 
representing a CES aggregator implicit in consumer utility functions.  In the literature, and in our 
model, both cases are specified with the same functional form.  While we have technically 
dropped the Armington assumption by allowing firms to differentiate products, the vector of γ 
parameters still provides a partial geographic anchor for production.  (Francois and Roland-Holst 
1997, Francois 1998). 
Globally, firms in different regions compete directly.  These firms are assumed to exhibit  
monopolistically competitive behaviour.  This means that individual firms produce unique 
varieties of good or service j, and hence are monopolists within their chosen market niche.  Given 
the demand for variety, reflected in equation (8), the demand for each variety is less than 
perfectly elastic.  However, while firms are thus able to price as monopolists, free entry (at least 
in the long-run) drives their economic profits to zero, so that pricing is at average cost.  The joint 
assumptions of average cost pricing and monopoly pricing, under Bertrand behaviour, imply the 
following conditions for each firm fi in region i: 
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The elasticity of demand for each firm fi will be defined by the following conditions. 
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In a fully symmetric equilibrium, we would have ζ=n-1.  However, the calibrated model includes 
CES weights γ , in each regional CES aggregation function, that will vary for firms from different 
regions.  Under these conditions,  ζ is a quantity weighted measure of market share.  To close the 
system for regional production, we index total resource costs for sector j in region i by the 
resource index Z.  Full employment of resources hired by firms in the sector j in region i then 
implies the following condition. 
 
(13) TC = Z f i, j ,
n
1=f
i j ,
i∑  
 
Cost functions for individual firms are defined as follows: 
 
(14) P )x b + a( = )xC( Zi j,i  j,i j,i j, i j,  
 
This specification of monopolistic competition is implemented under the “large group” 
assumption, which means that firms treat the variable n as "large", so that the perceived elasticity 
of demand equals the elasticity of substitution.  The relevant set of equations then collapses to 
the following: 
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In equation (16), n0 denotes the number of firms in the benchmark.   Through calibration, the 
initial CES weights in equation (16) include the valuation of variety.  As a result, the reduced 
  
 
74
form exhibits external scale effects, determined by changes in variety based on firm entry and 
exit, and determined by the substitution and scale elasticities. 
 
7.3 Markups 
Our average markup estimates are reported in Annex Table 1.  The starting point for these is 
recent estimated price-cost markups from the OECD (Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat 1996).  These 
provide estimates of markups, based on methods pioneered by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995).  
The Martins et al paper provides an overview of the recent empirical literature. 
Both Hall and Roeger focused their work on the United States.  In contrast, Martins et al 
provide estimates for most OECD Members.  However, because of data limitations, they did not 
provide estimates for the full matrix of countries and sectors.  (In other words there are empty 
cells in the matrix.)  To produce a complete matrix, Francois (2001) runs a cross-country 
regression, with dummy variables allowing for variations in markups by country (a general index 
of the degree of competition within a country) and by sector.  The resulting coefficients were 
then used to fill in missing values within the table.  The values reported in Annex Table are used 
either to calibrate the cost-disadvantage ratios and substitution elasticities under monopolistic 
competition.   They are taken from Francois (2001) and Martins et al (1996).  Their application, in 
terms of parameterizing the model, is explained in Francois (1998). 
 
8. Aggregation scheme 
The basic aggregation scheme for the model  is presented in Annex Tables 4 and 5.  Annex Table 
4 provides a basic overview of the sectors and regions in the model, while Annex Table 5 
provides a mapping to underlying GTAP5.2 sectors and regions.  This provides a sense of what 
products are in the sector aggregates, and what countries are in the regional aggregates.  
Industrial sectors have been aggregated into three groups: Chemicals, Metal and 
electrotechnical, and Other manufactures. This sectoring scheme is motivated by the forcus of 
this study on the Netherlands. The grouping has used the detailed Dutch Input-Output table  
(CBS, 1999) with 106 industries to cluster sectors on four indicators: share in industrial output, 
share in industrial value added, labour share in value added and trade openness. See Annex 
Figure 4 for key characteristics of these clusters. The sectoring scheme is then translated into 
GTAP sectors through Table 5. 
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Annex Table 1 
Model Parameters
A B C D = (B-1)/B E = 1/D F = D/(1-D)
trade 
substitution 
elasticities 
(regional 
differentiation)
average markup 
levels
elasticity of 
substitution in 
value added implied CDRs
trade 
substitution 
elasticity (firm 
differentiation)
Variety-scaled 
output scale 
elasticity (firm 
differentiation)
CERE Cerals 2.20 1.00 0.25 0.00 2.20 0.00
HORT
Horticulture & other 
crops 2.20 1.00 0.25 0.00 2.20 0.00
SUGA
Sugar, plants and 
processed 2.20 1.00 0.64 0.00 2.20 0.00
INTLIV
Intensive livestock 
&products 2.50 1.00 0.55 0.00 2.50 0.00
CATLE Cattle & beef products 2.45 1.00 0.57 0.00 2.45 0.00
DAIRY Milk & dairy 2.20 1.00 0.65 0.00 2.20 0.00
OAGR Other agriculture 2.75 1.00 0.20 0.00 2.75 0.00
PROCF
Processed food 
products 2.47 1.13 1.12 0.11 8.98 0.13
TEXT
Textiles, leather & 
clothing 3.32 1.13 1.26 0.11 8.91 0.13
EXTR Extraction industries 2.80 1.18 0.20 0.15 6.64 0.18
CHEM Petro & chemicals 2.05 1.20 1.26 0.17 6.01 0.20
MELE
Metal and 
electotechnical industry 3.39 1.21 1.26 0.17 5.72 0.21
OIND Other industries 2.30 1.20 1.26 0.17 5.95 0.20
TRAD Trade services 1.90 1.27 1.68 0.21 4.67 0.27
TRAN Transport services 1.90 1.27 1.68 0.21 4.67 0.27
BSVC
Business, financial & 
communnications 
services 1.90 1.27 1.26 0.21 4.67 0.27
OSVC
 Other private and 
public services 1.97 1.27 1.29 0.21 4.67 0.27  
sources: columns A, C are from the GTAP database.  Columns B, D, E, and F are from estimates 
discussed in this annex. 
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Annex Table 2 
Services regression results 
 
TRADE: trade services     
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.80     
R Square 0.64     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.55     
Standard Error 0.65     
Observations 16     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8.955 2.985 7.097 0.0053 
Residual 12 5.047 0.421   
Total 15 14.002       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat   
Intercept 0.317 1.995 0.159   
pop 0.728 0.173 4.202   
PCI 0.500 0.158 3.170   
EU 0.684 0.466 1.467   
      
TRAN: transport and logistics services    
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.98     
R Square 0.96     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.94     
Standard Error 0.27     
Observations 16     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 18.313 6.104 86.036 0.000 
Residual 12 0.851 0.071   
Total 15 19.165       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat   
Intercept -2.645 0.819 -3.229   
pop 0.803 0.071 11.288   
PCI 0.919 0.065 14.183   
EU 0.307 0.192 1.605   
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Annex Table 2 – continued 
 
BSRV: business services     
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.88     
R Square 0.78     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.72     
Standard Error 0.59     
Observations 16     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 14.490 4.830 14.083 0.0003 
Residual 12 4.116 0.343   
Total 15 18.606       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat   
Intercept -1.179 1.801 -0.654   
pop 0.789 0.156 5.045   
PCI 0.766 0.143 5.377   
EU 0.535 0.421 1.271   
      
      
OSVC: other services     
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.88     
R Square 0.77     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.71     
Standard Error 0.68     
Observations 16     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 18.611 6.204 13.279 0.0004 
Residual 12 5.606 0.467   
Total 15 24.217       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat   
Intercept -3.287 2.102 -1.564   
pop 0.844 0.183 4.623   
PCI 0.909 0.166 5.466   
EU 0.409 0.492 0.832   
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Annex Table 3 
Estimated services barriers (extra-EU trade) 
 
Estimated Services Trade Barriers (percent trade cost equivalents) 
      
Label Region trade  
transpor
t and 
logistics 
business 
services 
other 
services 
NLD Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FRA France 12.3 12.1 18.3 19.2 
DEU Germany 0.0 13.7 9.5 0.0 
REU15 Rest of EU 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CEEC CEECs 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MED Mediterranean and Middle East 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NAM North America 0.0 22.6 1.2 16.0 
SAM South America 13.8 10.4 8.6 5.9 
CHINA China 0.0 14.5 37.4 3.7 
INDIA India 61.3 63.9 32.1 62.2 
HINCAS High income Asia 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand 0.0 2.3 9.5 15.2 
SAF South Africa 28.3 17.5 32.8 22.6 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ROW Rest of World 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Based on gravity equation estimates.     
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Annex Table 4 
Model Aggregation Scheme 
 
Model Sectors and Regions
Label Region Label Sector
NLD Netherlands CERE Cerals
FRA France HORT Horticulture & other crops
DEU Germany SUGA Sugar, plants and processed
REU15 Rest of EU INTLIV Intensive livestock &products
CEEC CEECs CATLE Cattle & beef products
MED Mediterannean and Middle East DAIRY Milk & dairy
NAM North America OAGR Other agriculture
SAM South America PROCF Processed food products
CHINA China TEXT Textiles, leather & clothing
INDIA India EXTR Extraction industries
HINCAS High income asia CHEM Petro & chemicals
OASPAC Other Asia-Pacific MELE Metal and electotechnical ind
AUSNZ Australia and New Zealand OIND Other industries
SAF South Africs TRAD Trade services
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TRAN Transport services
ROW Rest of World BSVC Business, financial & communnications services
OSVC  Other private and public services
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Annex Table 5 
Mapping to GTAP Sectors and Regions
Model 
Sector GTAP Sector
Model 
Region GTAP Region -- continued
 CERE pdr,  Paddy rice                       OASPAC phl, Philippines                     
 CERE wht,  Wheat                            HINCAS sgp, Singapore                       
 CERE gro,  Cereal grains nec                OASPAC tha, Thailand                        
 HORT v_f,  Vegetables, fruit, nuts          OASPAC vnm,  Vietnam                         
 HORT osd, Oil seeds                        OASPAC bgd, Bangladesh                      
 SUGA c_b, Sugar cane, sugar beet           INDIA ind, India                           
 HORT pfb, Plant-based fibers               OASPAC lka, Sri Lanka                       
 HORT ocr, Crops nec                        HINCAS xsa,  Rest of South Asia              
 CATLE ctl, Cattle,sheep,goats,horses        NAM can, Canada                          
 INTLIV oap, Animal products nec              NAM usa, United States                   
 DAIRY rmk, Raw milk                         SAM mex, Mexico                          
 OAGR wol, Wool, silk-worm cocoons          SAM xcm, Central America, Caribbean      
 OAGR for, Forestry                         SAM col, Colombia                        
 OAGR fsh, Fishing                          SAM per, Peru                            
 EXTR col, Coal                             SAM ven, Venezuela                       
 EXTR oil, Oil                              SAM xap,  Rest of Andean Pact             
 EXTR gas, Gas                              SAM arg, Argentina                       
 EXTR omn, Minerals nec                     SAM bra, Brazil                          
 CATLE cmt, Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse   SAM chl, Chile                           
 INTLIV omt. Meat products nec                SAM ury, Uruguay                         
 PROCF vol, Vegetable oils and fats          SAM xsm,  Rest of South America           
 DAIRY mil, Dairy products                   REU15 aut,  Austria                         
 PROCF pcr, Processed rice                   REU15 bel, Belgium                         
 SUGA sgr, Sugar                            REU15 dnk,  Denmark                         
 PROCF ofd, Food products nec                REU15 fin,  Finland                         
 PROCF b_t, Beverages and tobacco products   FRA fra, France                          
 TEXT tex, Textiles                         DEU deu, Germany                         
 TEXT wap, Wearing apparel                  REU15 gbr, United Kingdom                  
 TEXT lea, Leather products                 DEU grc, Greece                          
 OIND lum, Wood products                    REU15 irl, Ireland                         
 OIND ppp, Paper products, publishing       REU15 ita, Italy                           
 CHEM p_c, Petroleum, coal products         REU15 lux,  Luxembourg                      
 CHEM crp, Chemical,rubber,plastic prods    NLD nld, Netherlands                     
 CHEM nmm, Mineral products nec             REU15 prt, Portugal                        
 MELE i_s, Ferrous metals                   REU15 esp, Spain                           
 MELE nfm, Metals nec                       REU15 swe, Sweden                          
 MELE fmp, Metal products                   ROW che, Switzerland                     
 MELE mvh, Motor vehicles and parts         ROW xef,  Rest of EFTA                    
 MELE otn, Transport equipment nec          CEEC bgr, Bulgaria                        
 MELE ele, Electronic equipment             CEEC hrv,  Croatia                         
 MELE ome, Machinery and equipment nec      CEEC cze, Czech Republic                  
 OIND omf, Manufactures nec                 CEEC hun, Hungary                         
 OSVC ely, Electricity                      CEEC mlt, Malta                           
 OSVC gdt, Gas manufacture, distribution    CEEC pol, Poland                          
 OSVC wtr, Water                            CEEC rom, Romania                         
 OSVC cns, Construction                     CEEC svk, Slovakia                        
 TRAD trd, Trade                            CEEC svn, Slovenia                        
 TRAN otp, Transport nec                    CEEC est, Estonia                         
 TRAN wtp, Sea transport                    CEEC lva,  Latvia                          
 TRAN atp, Air transport                    CEEC ltu,  Lithuania                       
 BSVC cmn, Communication                    ROW xsu, Rest of Former Soviet Union     
 BSVC ofi, Financial services nec           MED cyp, Cyprus                          
 BSVC isr, Insurance                        MED tur, Turkey                          
 BSVC obs, Business services nec            MED xme, Rest of Middle East             
 OSVC ros, Recreation and other services    MED mar, Morocco                         
 OSVC osg, PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat   MED xnf, Rest of North Africa            
 OSVC dwe, Dwellings                        SSA bwa, Botswana                        
 SAF xsc, Rest of SACU                    
Model 
Region GTAP Region  SSA mwi, Malawi                          
 AUSNZ aus, Australia                        SSA moz, Mozambique                      
 AUSNZ nzl, New Zealand                      SSA tza, Tanzania                        
 CHINA chn, China                            SSA zmb, Zambia                          
 CHINA hkg, Hong Kong                        SSA zwe, Zimbabwe                        
 HINCAS jpn, Japan                            SSA xsf, Other Southern Africa           
 HINCAS kor, Korea                            SSA uga, Uganda                          
 HINCAS twn, Taiwan                           SSA xss, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa      
 OASPAC idn,  Indonesia                        ROW xrw,  Rest of World                   
 OASPAC mys,  Malaysia                         
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Annex Figure 1  
The Flow of Production 
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Annex Figure 2  
Trading Costs in the Service Sector 
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Annex Figure 3 
Agricultural quotas 
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Annex Figure 4 
Characteristics of Dutch industry aggregates  
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CHEM, Chemical industies 
 27 Aardolieverwerking, splijt- en kweekstoffen, cokes 
 28 Chemie basis 
 29 Chemie anorganisch 
 30 Petrochemie 
 31 Kunstmest 
 32 Chemie eind 
 33 Rubber en kunststof 
MELE, meatla and electrotechnical industries 
 35 Basismetaal 
 36 Metaalprodukten 
 37 Machines en apparaten 
 38 Huishoudelijke apparaten 
 39 Kantoormachines en computers 
 40 Overige elektrische machines en apparaten 
 41 Audio-, video- en telecommunicatie-apparatuur 
 42 Medische, meet- en regelapparatuur 
 43 Auto-industrie 
 44 Scheepbouw 
 45 Spoorwegmaterieel, vlieg- en ruimtevaartuigen 
 46 Transportmiddelen overig 
OIND, Other industries 
 22 Hout, kurk, riet en vlechtwerk 
 23 Pulp, papier en karton 
 24 Papier- en kartonwaren 
 25 Uitgeverijen en drukkerijen 
 26 Reproductie van opgenomen media 
 34 Bouwmaterialen 
 47 Meubels en matrassen 
 48 Goederen overig n.e.g. 
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Table A-1: Average trade weighted import tariffs (base situation) 
 NLD FRA DEU REU15 CEEC MED NAM SAM CHINA INDIA 
HIN
CAS 
OAS
PAC 
AUS
NZ SAF SSA ROW 
Average 
Cereals 2 8 2 8 4 38 7 9 105 0 95 7 1 41 13 51 48 
Horticulture 4 4 3 5 3 58 14 12 10 26 33 38 3 14 20 37 18 
Sugar 36 38 14 38 36 19 43 18 22 20 60 24 10 86 23 13 33 
Intensive livestock 5 2 2 4 4 73 7 15 10 15 35 25 4 39 21 51 22 
Cattle 17 11 28 19 12 85 7 14 6 18 37 15 1 68 12 39 29 
Dairy 3 5 4 7 9 100 55 21 8 26 174 17 7 75 17 48 49 
Other agriculture 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 7 4 8 3 5 0 10 16 2 5 
Processed foods 7 5 5 9 2 62 11 17 28 36 33 24 6 49 27 43 22 
Textiles  4 4 2 4 3 16 14 17 19 31 10 23 19 23 25 14 12 
Extraction 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 4 0 21 1 3 0 0 4 1 3 
Chemicals 1 1 1 1 0 8 4 9 8 19 3 13 3 5 14 4 6 
Metal, electronic 1 1 1 1 0 9 2 13 8 26 2 9 5 8 16 4 6 
Other industry 0 0 0 1 0 10 3 12 9 15 2 13 4 8 23 4 6 
Trade  0 6 0 6 1 2 0 14 0 61 0 0 0 28 0 7 7 
Transport  0 8 10 0 0 0 21 10 15 64 0 0 2 18 0 0 10 
Business services 0 10 5 0 0 0 1 9 37 32 6 0 10 33 0 0 6 
Other services 0 12 0 0 0 0 14 6 4 62 0 0 15 23 0 0 6 
Average 1 3 2 2 1 15 5 12 11 26 9 10 6 14 13 9   
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Table A-2: Average trade weighted import tariffs on a region exports (base situation) 
 NLD FRA DEU REU15 CEEC MED NAM SAM CHINA INDIA 
HIN
CAS 
OAS
PAC 
AUS
NZ SAF SSA ROW 
Average 
Cereals 6 6 5 22 12 35 48 30 131 30 14 41 49 24 44 12 40 
Horticulture 5 7 5 7 6 16 25 13 27 21 22 17 23 17 11 19 16 
Sugar 8 7 11 14 14 52 36 34 24 45 18 49 30 59 72 65 34 
Intensive livestock 5 19 7 18 9 17 24 48 28 13 13 22 17 25 16 12 21 
Cattle 5 6 10 15 6 32 40 63 28 30 24 21 37 74 67 41 30 
Dairy 21 22 10 28 23 36 95 65 38 32 28 19 65 70 66 79 35 
Other agriculture 1 1 0 1 0 5 3 3 7 4 4 2 6 5 3 2 5 
Processed foods 8 12 7 16 5 23 31 24 31 21 21 26 29 30 28 29 21 
Textiles  3 9 4 7 2 10 15 12 13 11 19 12 8 14 11 11 12 
Extraction 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 0 3 
Chemicals 1 2 2 3 3 8 6 4 7 7 9 4 6 10 4 2 6 
Metal, electronic 1 2 2 3 2 6 5 3 4 7 6 2 4 6 5 4 6 
Other industry 1 2 2 4 2 4 5 3 4 2 8 4 4 6 2 2 6 
Trade  2 2 2 2 1 5 5 5 3 5 5 6 5 4 5 5 5 
Transport  10 8 7 6 6 9 4 7 8 6 8 8 9 8 9 8 9 
Business services 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 
Other services 3 3 5 4 2 5 2 5 5 5 5 7 5 6 7 4 6 
Average 3 4 3 4 3 5 8 10 10 10 7 8 13 8 7 5   
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Table A-3  Selfsufficiency or domestic share in total use (base situation) 
 NLD FRA DEU REU15 CEEC MED NAM SAM CHINA INDIA HINCAS OASPAC AUSNZ SAF SSA ROW 
Cereals 0.19 2.12 0.87 0.71 0.99 0.75 1.26 1.02 0.96 1.00 0.61 0.92 1.94 1.03 0.96 0.97 
Horticulture 1.24 0.86 0.44 0.87 0.90 0.99 0.94 1.17 1.00 1.03 0.87 1.02 1.16 1.34 1.34 0.84 
Sugar 0.94 1.25 1.05 0.88 1.06 0.83 0.89 1.12 0.85 1.01 0.83 1.00 1.23 1.30 0.97 0.82 
Intensive 
livestock 1.40 1.04 0.86 1.01 1.01 0.83 1.04 1.03 0.99 1.00 0.80 1.01 1.23 0.98 0.98 0.85 
Cattle 1.21 1.02 0.98 0.93 1.06 0.89 1.01 1.02 0.93 1.03 0.82 0.93 1.51 0.98 1.00 0.92 
Dairy 1.15 1.07 1.02 0.99 1.04 0.85 0.98 0.97 0.86 1.00 0.86 0.79 1.39 0.94 0.78 0.96 
Other 
agriculture 0.75 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.99 1.12 1.00 0.92 0.99 0.80 0.96 1.60 1.09 1.23 1.38 
Processed foods 1.59 1.07 0.99 1.02 0.62 0.84 1.00 1.05 0.93 1.04 0.91 1.02 1.04 0.96 0.97 0.90 
Textiles and 
clothing 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.40 2.22 0.82 0.37 0.98 1.45 1.58 0.84 2.10 0.61 0.74 0.73 0.56 
Extraction 0.55 0.18 0.25 0.43 0.61 2.33 0.82 1.29 0.97 0.67 0.18 1.18 1.50 1.19 4.27 1.50 
Chemicals 1.28 1.06 1.10 1.00 0.82 1.02 1.00 0.91 0.86 0.88 1.01 0.76 0.82 0.92 0.64 1.05 
Metal and 
electronic equip 0.88 1.08 1.21 1.03 0.10 0.60 0.98 0.81 0.76 0.79 1.16 0.49 0.80 0.98 0.37 0.97 
Other industry 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.07 0.66 0.89 0.98 0.96 1.04 0.93 0.96 1.04 0.92 1.05 0.98 0.95 
Trade  1.01 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.08 0.99 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.01 0.83 0.99 
Transport and 
logistics 1.66 1.05 0.98 1.15 1.19 1.18 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.15 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.20 
Business 
services 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.02 0.95 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.99 
Other services 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 
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Table A-4  Partial Liberalization, with a linear 50% reduction in  tariffs (increasing returns to scale)    
Static Export Effects, percent change in quantity        
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 1.29 0.66 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.36 -0.28 -0.05 0.17 0.11 
France 6.02 1.10 -0.22 0.20 0.72 0.73 2.58 0.03 0.46 0.14 
Germany 4.92 0.76 -0.02 0.11 1.12 0.78 1.13 0.01 0.65 0.16 
Rest of EU 15 3.98 1.00 0.16 0.17 0.77 0.69 0.29 -0.01 0.51 0.18 
CEECs -2.19 0.68 -0.01 -0.30 -1.85 -0.71 0.22 -0.04 -0.32 -0.15 
Mediterranean 19.72 0.79 -0.06 6.39 1.34 6.82 1.07 0.16 0.67 2.08 
North America 11.75 1.86 -0.06 0.52 3.53 1.06 2.35 0.08 1.84 0.37 
South America 35.21 2.97 0.00 5.35 1.16 15.83 0.85 1.79 1.03 3.88 
China 53.81 1.58 -0.01 5.63 13.17 19.22 0.75 0.30 3.38 7.54 
India 47.23 0.21 0.00 4.48 2.27 25.98 -0.03 9.56 1.08 3.05 
High Income Asia 18.43 3.71 0.02 0.47 5.54 3.11 0.60 -0.02 3.67 0.86 
Other Asia-Pacific 20.99 0.49 -0.02 4.56 2.27 10.29 -0.25 -0.05 1.17 2.29 
Australia-NZ 14.32 2.71 0.00 0.63 4.55 0.57 2.55 0.08 2.56 0.32 
South Africa 27.59 0.65 -0.05 6.55 1.19 9.58 0.32 5.50 1.14 2.67 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.73 2.57 -0.24 5.47 0.57 8.88 0.77 0.15 0.65 1.83 
Rest of World 15.94 1.41 -0.01 0.46 0.84 1.05 0.46 0.05 1.07 0.36 
 93 
 
Table A-5  Partial Liberalization, with a linear 50% reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)  
Long-Run Export Effects, percent change in quantity        
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 3.92 0.73 0.18 0.11 0.22 1.23 -0.19 -0.02 0.93 0.64 
France 7.70 1.12 0.09 0.23 0.89 1.13 2.78 0.04 0.81 0.29 
Germany 7.25 0.70 0.07 0.40 1.93 1.36 1.23 0.02 0.99 0.18 
Rest of EU 15 5.18 1.00 0.33 0.18 0.88 1.06 0.34 0.00 0.81 0.32 
CEECs 10.01 0.41 0.15 1.55 3.37 2.09 0.52 0.06 0.88 -0.37 
Mediterranean 23.45 0.78 -0.03 7.22 2.06 7.59 1.17 0.21 1.08 2.75 
North America 13.02 1.83 0.00 0.41 3.39 1.77 2.42 0.09 2.23 0.73 
South America 37.64 3.09 0.07 5.31 1.25 16.64 0.91 1.94 1.52 4.56 
China 54.70 0.75 0.10 5.77 12.08 22.30 0.56 0.29 3.78 6.98 
India 55.07 0.57 0.10 4.78 3.23 27.60 0.07 10.90 2.20 4.71 
High Income Asia 21.62 3.80 0.09 0.21 5.25 4.84 0.60 0.01 4.56 1.85 
Other Asia-Pacific 51.30 4.09 0.22 1.26 0.74 22.71 -0.54 0.31 7.68 14.60 
Australia-NZ 16.42 2.69 0.06 0.55 4.62 1.30 2.65 0.12 3.19 0.85 
South Africa 30.86 0.54 -0.02 7.18 1.55 10.71 0.35 5.90 1.44 3.17 
Sub-Saharan Africa 23.35 2.52 -0.23 6.10 0.78 9.87 0.82 0.22 0.90 2.37 
Rest of World 17.59 1.37 0.04 0.63 1.21 1.56 0.49 0.04 1.34 0.40 
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Table A-6 Partial Liberalization, with a Swiss-formula based reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)  
Static Export Effects, percent change in quantity        
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 0.97 0.68 0.08 0.12 -0.07 0.20 -0.28 -0.05 0.16 0.10 
France 5.74 1.15 -0.22 0.33 0.25 0.49 2.57 0.03 0.45 0.14 
Germany 3.72 0.81 -0.02 0.17 0.31 0.44 1.12 0.01 0.61 0.14 
Rest of EU 15 3.26 1.00 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.39 0.29 -0.01 0.49 0.17 
CEECs -1.75 0.66 -0.01 -0.42 -1.18 -0.57 0.23 -0.04 -0.34 -0.16 
Mediterranean 21.28 0.87 -0.06 11.31 0.58 4.24 1.06 0.15 0.66 2.09 
North America 9.14 1.42 -0.07 0.73 1.79 0.51 2.32 0.09 1.81 0.36 
South America 27.87 2.55 0.00 4.18 0.44 11.02 0.84 1.79 0.99 3.73 
China 37.24 1.56 -0.02 6.70 7.81 8.96 0.57 0.39 3.01 6.56 
India 48.13 0.30 0.00 5.98 0.66 26.97 -0.05 9.50 1.13 3.13 
High Income Asia 13.63 4.32 0.01 0.55 1.95 1.54 0.58 -0.01 3.56 0.74 
Other Asia-Pacific 17.46 0.63 -0.02 4.68 1.42 7.55 -0.24 -0.06 1.13 2.18 
Australia-NZ 12.36 3.36 0.00 0.72 2.33 0.16 2.54 0.08 2.53 0.29 
South Africa 29.70 0.76 -0.06 11.56 0.41 6.82 0.33 5.48 1.15 2.69 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.68 2.92 -0.24 6.44 0.29 7.80 0.76 0.16 0.64 1.83 
Rest of World 16.05 1.63 -0.01 0.87 0.37 0.71 0.46 0.06 1.08 0.34 
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Table A-7  Partial Liberalization, with a Swiss-formula based reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)   
Long-Run Export Effects, percent change in quantity        
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
Qxwreg                     
Netherlands 3.47 0.74 0.19 0.24 -0.06 0.74 -0.19 -0.02 0.98 0.73 
France 7.28 1.17 0.09 0.35 0.38 0.76 2.78 0.04 0.81 0.31 
Germany 6.27 0.73 0.07 0.65 0.98 1.10 1.23 0.03 1.01 0.20 
Rest of EU 15 4.30 0.98 0.33 0.24 0.33 0.62 0.34 0.00 0.80 0.35 
CEECs 10.09 0.37 0.15 2.47 2.48 2.42 0.52 0.09 1.00 -0.34 
Mediterranean 24.83 0.82 -0.03 12.08 1.01 5.19 1.17 0.21 1.12 2.79 
North America 10.48 1.32 0.00 0.61 1.74 0.99 2.42 0.07 2.28 0.88 
South America 30.10 2.63 0.06 4.13 0.39 11.73 0.90 1.92 1.51 4.48 
China 51.53 0.50 0.15 7.74 11.64 14.41 0.63 0.04 5.18 8.81 
India 54.16 0.61 0.10 6.32 0.86 27.91 0.05 10.78 2.21 4.62 
High Income Asia 18.25 4.30 0.10 0.45 2.26 3.02 0.59 -0.04 4.80 2.28 
Other Asia-Pacific 43.58 4.17 0.25 1.90 -2.38 14.11 -0.80 0.27 9.00 16.79 
Australia-NZ 14.49 3.22 0.06 0.66 2.39 0.75 2.65 0.10 3.26 1.01 
South Africa 33.28 0.61 -0.03 12.46 0.75 7.86 0.37 5.89 1.50 3.27 
Sub-Saharan Africa 23.87 2.87 -0.23 7.26 0.46 9.06 0.83 0.22 0.93 2.44 
Rest of World 18.08 1.54 0.04 1.13 0.83 1.26 0.50 0.03 1.43 0.51 
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Table A-8  Full Liberalization (increasing returns to scale)   
Static Export Effects, percent change in quantity        
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 2.91 2.02 0.06 0.32 0.26 0.49 -0.64 -0.11 0.37 0.17 
France 15.58 3.71 -0.29 0.96 1.51 1.68 5.61 0.05 1.07 0.28 
Germany 12.50 2.68 0.03 0.67 2.72 1.80 2.27 0.02 1.48 0.35 
Rest of EU 15 9.73 3.19 0.37 0.64 1.60 1.29 0.61 -0.02 1.12 0.31 
CEECs 1.06 2.26 0.00 -0.14 -1.57 -0.42 0.32 -0.04 -0.17 -0.06 
Mediterranean 50.58 2.76 -0.09 20.04 3.33 15.48 2.18 0.26 1.62 4.61 
North America 23.98 4.94 -0.13 1.29 6.11 1.70 5.37 0.14 3.71 0.58 
South America 78.58 7.46 0.20 13.90 2.14 37.72 1.89 3.75 2.18 8.84 
China 102.06 3.81 -0.05 16.16 20.34 37.69 1.49 0.67 5.39 13.39 
India 120.35 0.38 -0.05 13.90 4.65 67.61 -0.05 23.01 2.33 7.19 
High Income Asia 40.12 11.33 0.14 1.24 10.40 5.97 1.23 0.01 7.65 1.33 
Other Asia-Pacific 51.85 1.48 -0.10 12.89 4.00 25.92 -0.72 -0.12 2.66 5.58 
Australia-NZ 29.15 7.09 0.03 1.29 8.21 0.73 5.48 0.17 5.07 0.45 
South Africa 70.86 2.16 -0.10 23.96 2.19 19.87 0.54 13.47 2.47 5.53 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 51.27 7.48 -0.35 19.41 0.63 17.21 1.55 0.24 1.44 3.73 
Rest of World 39.43 4.82 -0.01 1.39 1.53 1.89 0.91 0.10 2.21 0.55 
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Table A-9  Full Liberalization (increasing returns to scale)    
Long-Run Export Effects, percent change in quantity        
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 7.32 1.93 0.36 0.04 0.35 1.76 -0.44 -0.02 1.99 1.26 
France 18.53 3.57 0.36 0.77 1.76 2.44 6.06 0.09 1.82 0.63 
Germany 14.94 2.50 0.24 0.80 3.33 2.44 2.44 0.05 2.03 0.47 
Rest of EU 15 11.98 3.03 0.77 0.57 1.86 1.98 0.72 0.02 1.76 0.60 
CEECs 19.07 1.73 0.44 2.99 4.97 4.03 0.74 0.04 1.70 -0.38 
Mediterranean 54.05 2.74 0.01 18.35 4.00 16.77 2.33 0.40 2.55 6.34 
North America 25.91 4.74 0.01 0.71 5.98 2.65 5.51 0.22 4.61 1.37 
South America 83.27 7.65 0.39 13.28 2.32 39.23 2.00 4.18 3.26 10.47 
China 92.54 2.75 0.17 12.83 16.36 36.92 0.97 1.06 6.16 12.78 
India 137.99 1.38 0.35 10.22 6.28 72.67 0.04 27.71 5.27 12.19 
High Income Asia 44.21 11.40 0.34 -0.41 9.99 7.78 1.20 0.15 9.63 3.43 
Other Asia-Pacific 99.85 9.36 0.76 -3.48 3.35 41.39 -1.73 1.08 17.31 31.63 
Australia-NZ 32.09 7.03 0.20 0.56 8.22 1.50 5.70 0.30 6.38 1.54 
South Africa 78.44 1.93 -0.05 24.65 2.84 22.80 0.62 14.65 3.23 7.00 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 59.61 7.40 -0.32 20.48 1.15 21.05 1.62 0.41 2.32 5.88 
Rest of World 41.57 4.87 0.11 1.45 1.86 2.56 0.96 0.10 2.78 0.72 
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Table A-10 Partial Liberalization, with a linear 50% reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)  
Static Change in Unskilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 1.25 0.27 0.00 -0.07 0.28 0.31 0.04 0.02 0.30 0.10 
France 0.96 0.25 0.08 -0.09 0.09 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.08 0.03 
Germany 0.90 0.33 0.04 -0.06 0.08 0.20 0.21 -0.01 0.09 0.04 
Rest of EU 15 0.79 0.28 0.06 -0.06 0.11 0.21 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.05 
CEECs -0.98 0.59 -0.08 -0.20 -1.12 -0.37 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 
Mediterranean 3.04 -0.14 -0.09 2.35 0.24 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.20 
North America 0.44 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.03 
South America 0.14 -0.25 -0.02 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.09 
China 0.56 -0.23 -0.04 1.37 -0.60 -0.03 -0.01 0.12 -0.03 0.02 
India 1.84 -0.15 -0.01 0.44 0.07 0.73 0.03 0.47 0.06 0.16 
High Income Asia 1.89 0.95 -0.02 0.00 0.20 0.31 0.07 0.00 0.29 0.05 
Other Asia-Pacific 3.21 -0.32 -0.03 0.89 1.12 0.91 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.34 
Australia-NZ 0.91 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.06 
South Africa 2.73 -0.18 -0.03 1.27 0.13 0.64 0.07 0.32 0.16 0.34 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.50 -0.04 -0.06 0.72 0.00 0.42 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.23 
Rest of World 2.23 -0.21 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.17 0.06 
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Table A-11  Partial Liberalization, with a linear 50% reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)  
Static Change in Skilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 1.01 0.27 0.03 -0.14 0.24 0.22 0 0.04 0.3 0.07 
France 0.85 0.32 0.08 -0.12 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.11 0.04 
Germany 0.97 0.34 0.04 -0.06 0.1 0.2 0.21 0 0.12 0.04 
Rest of EU 15 0.9 0.32 0.04 -0.08 0.14 0.21 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.05 
CEECs 3.81 0.58 -0.11 0.18 1.06 0.79 0.16 0.07 0.53 0.21 
Mediterranean 4.36 -0.29 -0.11 3.11 0.06 0.7 0.23 0.06 0.07 0.47 
North America 0.78 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.29 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.05 
South America 0.05 -0.34 -0.03 0.13 0.01 0.22 0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.18 
China -1.98 -0.43 -0.06 1.7 -1.81 -0.76 0.05 0.04 -0.27 -0.31 
India 0.96 -0.24 -0.02 0.59 -0.02 0.55 0.08 -0.2 0.02 0.17 
High Income Asia 2.36 1.07 -0.03 0.03 0.4 0.32 0.06 0.01 0.35 0.1 
Other Asia-Pacific 3.66 -0.44 -0.04 1.19 0 1.59 0.35 0.07 0.13 0.75 
Australia-NZ 0.48 -0.3 -0.01 -0.08 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.02 0.23 0.07 
South Africa 2.77 -0.23 -0.03 1.43 0.16 0.93 0.15 -0.28 0.15 0.48 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.03 -0.77 0 1.32 -0.03 0.83 0.27 0.04 0.01 0.38 
Rest of World 2.61 -0.35 -0.03 -0.02 0.1 0.29 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.09 
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Table A12  Partial Liberalization, with a linear 50% reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)   
Long-Run Change in Unskilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 3.59 0.34 0.07 -0.07 0.18 1.16 0.12 0.04 1.08 0.62 
France 2.29 0.30 0.49 -0.08 0.15 0.46 0.61 0.00 0.34 0.06 
Germany 1.70 0.32 0.11 -0.03 0.18 0.41 0.34 -0.02 0.30 0.06 
Rest of EU 15 1.52 0.28 0.26 -0.08 0.14 0.44 0.05 -0.02 0.36 0.08 
CEECs 16.07 0.12 0.15 2.73 6.83 3.22 0.57 0.06 1.44 -1.04 
Mediterranean 7.05 -0.16 -0.11 3.83 0.68 0.54 0.23 0.04 0.49 1.33 
North America 0.65 -0.15 0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.58 0.11 -0.03 0.25 0.00 
South America 2.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.29 0.17 0.67 0.07 0.29 0.17 0.67 
China -8.80 0.43 -0.07 -0.11 -3.47 -5.70 -0.08 0.47 -0.14 0.27 
India 11.29 0.62 0.06 -0.52 1.03 2.44 -0.02 4.11 0.96 2.27 
High Income Asia 3.08 0.74 -0.01 0.04 0.48 0.75 0.08 -0.01 0.74 0.20 
Other Asia-Pacific 19.65 1.76 0.09 -0.92 1.50 6.58 0.20 0.15 3.42 6.74 
Australia-NZ 2.32 -0.19 0.03 0.04 0.52 0.48 0.43 -0.02 0.79 0.13 
South Africa 5.49 -0.29 -0.05 1.76 0.41 1.62 0.08 0.70 0.37 0.86 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.64 0.01 -0.10 1.54 0.48 2.59 0.19 0.05 0.50 1.52 
Rest of World 3.14 -0.18 -0.02 0.03 0.24 0.42 0.09 -0.01 0.34 0.07 
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Table A-13  Partial Liberalization, with a linear 50% reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)   
Long-Run Change in Skilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 3.17 0.35 0.09 -0.16 0.06 1.02 0.08 0.06 1.07 0.59 
France 2.05 0.37 0.49 -0.12 0.16 0.39 0.43 0.00 0.35 0.04 
Germany 1.74 0.32 0.11 -0.03 0.20 0.41 0.34 -0.01 0.32 0.05 
Rest of EU 15 1.54 0.31 0.26 -0.10 0.14 0.41 0.08 -0.01 0.38 0.07 
CEECs 27.63 -0.32 0.16 4.82 13.04 5.62 0.87 0.16 2.33 -1.84 
Mediterranean 8.21 -0.32 -0.14 4.64 0.43 1.07 0.37 0.07 0.34 1.58 
North America 0.94 -0.18 0.04 -0.08 0.17 0.61 0.22 -0.03 0.26 -0.01 
South America 1.93 -0.15 -0.03 0.27 0.16 0.79 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.75 
China -12.50 0.33 -0.10 0.03 -4.82 -7.24 -0.02 0.41 -0.46 -0.05 
India 8.74 0.40 0.03 -0.16 0.76 1.92 0.04 2.88 0.71 1.86 
High Income Asia 3.54 0.84 -0.02 0.10 0.70 0.80 0.07 -0.02 0.77 0.19 
Other Asia-Pacific 22.85 2.04 0.08 -1.13 -0.37 8.88 0.27 0.23 4.11 8.63 
Australia-NZ 1.76 -0.54 0.02 -0.03 0.60 0.51 0.26 -0.02 0.80 0.08 
South Africa 5.60 -0.36 -0.05 1.96 0.46 1.95 0.15 0.10 0.36 1.00 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.47 -0.75 -0.06 2.17 0.36 2.76 0.33 0.05 0.30 1.48 
Rest of World 3.45 -0.34 -0.04 0.02 0.22 0.50 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.07 
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Table A-14  Partial Liberalization, with a Swiss-formula based reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)  
Static Change in Unskilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 0.88 0.29 0.00 -0.10 0.10 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.30 0.09 
France 0.76 0.29 0.08 -0.14 0.05 0.17 0.36 0.00 0.08 0.03 
Germany 0.78 0.35 0.04 -0.11 0.04 0.13 0.21 -0.01 0.09 0.04 
Rest of EU 15 0.62 0.32 0.06 -0.09 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.05 
CEECs -0.54 0.60 -0.08 -0.26 -0.67 -0.31 0.10 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 
Mediterranean 4.92 -0.14 -0.09 4.34 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.21 
North America 0.25 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.03 
South America 0.02 -0.22 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.09 
China 2.01 -0.24 -0.04 1.80 -0.30 0.42 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.16 
India 1.90 -0.13 -0.01 0.65 0.00 0.63 0.03 0.47 0.07 0.17 
High Income Asia 2.09 1.37 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.28 0.05 
Other Asia-Pacific 2.91 -0.27 -0.02 0.88 0.80 0.75 0.19 -0.01 0.15 0.41 
Australia-NZ 0.75 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.19 0.05 
South Africa 3.38 -0.16 -0.04 2.24 0.03 0.48 0.07 0.32 0.17 0.34 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.52 -0.02 -0.06 0.86 -0.03 0.31 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.23 
Rest of World 2.76 -0.22 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.17 0.06 
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Table A-15  Partial Liberalization, with a Swiss-formula based reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)  
Static Change in Skilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 0.69 0.30 0.03 -0.20 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.30 0.06 
France 0.56 0.36 0.08 -0.19 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.01 0.11 0.04 
Germany 0.84 0.36 0.04 -0.11 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.12 0.04 
Rest of EU 15 0.71 0.35 0.05 -0.12 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.05 
CEECs 2.41 0.60 -0.10 0.11 0.37 0.35 0.16 0.06 0.44 0.14 
Mediterranean 6.55 -0.28 -0.11 5.40 0.03 0.61 0.24 0.06 0.08 0.47 
North America 0.55 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.19 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.05 
South America -0.12 -0.30 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.15 0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.17 
China 0.73 -0.53 -0.06 2.24 -1.10 0.38 0.09 0.02 -0.17 -0.09 
India 1.13 -0.23 -0.02 0.86 -0.03 0.40 0.09 -0.20 0.02 0.17 
High Income Asia 2.43 1.54 -0.03 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.34 0.09 
Other Asia-Pacific 3.13 -0.40 -0.04 1.28 -0.07 0.98 0.35 0.07 0.12 0.74 
Australia-NZ 0.09 -0.50 -0.01 -0.10 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.06 
South Africa 3.37 -0.23 -0.04 2.42 0.06 0.75 0.14 -0.29 0.16 0.48 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.19 -0.78 0.00 1.58 -0.05 0.74 0.27 0.03 0.01 0.38 
Rest of World 3.17 -0.40 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.08 
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A-16 Partial Liberalization, with a Swiss-formula based reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)   
Long-Run Change in Unskilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 3.09 0.36 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.65 0.11 0.04 1.14 0.73 
France 1.95 0.35 0.49 -0.14 0.10 0.30 0.61 -0.01 0.34 0.06 
Germany 1.43 0.34 0.11 -0.08 0.10 0.25 0.34 -0.02 0.30 0.07 
Rest of EU 15 1.21 0.30 0.27 -0.13 0.08 0.24 0.06 -0.02 0.36 0.09 
CEECs 17.96 0.03 0.14 4.78 5.73 4.31 0.65 0.14 1.70 -1.24 
Mediterranean 8.43 -0.18 -0.11 5.22 0.24 0.99 0.24 0.03 0.49 1.33 
North America 0.26 -0.23 0.04 -0.15 0.05 0.24 0.11 -0.04 0.26 0.04 
South America 1.90 -0.05 -0.02 0.26 0.04 0.65 0.08 0.28 0.18 0.68 
China -9.88 0.78 -0.08 -0.47 -4.70 -3.73 -0.12 0.58 -0.82 -0.65 
India 9.86 0.60 0.06 -0.84 0.27 2.29 -0.02 4.04 0.97 2.26 
High Income Asia 2.96 0.98 -0.01 0.08 0.27 0.48 0.08 -0.02 0.77 0.25 
Other Asia-Pacific 16.62 1.79 0.10 -0.79 -0.30 3.75 0.10 0.13 3.98 7.73 
Australia-NZ 2.12 -0.21 0.03 0.08 0.46 0.27 0.44 -0.03 0.82 0.17 
South Africa 5.93 -0.28 -0.05 2.80 0.20 1.30 0.08 0.69 0.38 0.87 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.71 0.03 -0.10 1.93 0.21 2.50 0.20 0.04 0.50 1.50 
Rest of World 3.56 -0.22 -0.02 0.02 0.17 0.32 0.09 -0.02 0.36 0.09 
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Table A-17 Partial Liberalization, with a Swiss-formula based reduction in tariffs (increasing returns to scale)   
Long-Run Change in Skilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 2.69 0.37 0.10 -0.13 -0.12 0.53 0.06 0.05 1.13 0.70 
France 1.61 0.42 0.49 -0.19 0.11 0.19 0.44 0.00 0.34 0.04 
Germany 1.47 0.34 0.11 -0.07 0.11 0.24 0.34 -0.02 0.32 0.06 
Rest of EU 15 1.19 0.33 0.26 -0.17 0.09 0.21 0.08 -0.01 0.37 0.08 
CEECs 29.43 -0.47 0.15 7.99 10.30 7.23 0.97 0.27 2.69 -2.16 
Mediterranean 9.90 -0.33 -0.14 6.28 0.11 1.45 0.39 0.06 0.35 1.59 
North America 0.53 -0.26 0.04 -0.16 0.20 0.27 0.22 -0.04 0.27 0.03 
South America 1.77 -0.14 -0.03 0.24 0.04 0.75 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.76 
China -13.57 0.60 -0.12 -0.39 -6.05 -4.69 -0.07 0.55 -1.31 -1.21 
India 7.72 0.38 0.03 -0.35 0.22 1.77 0.04 2.83 0.71 1.85 
High Income Asia 3.45 1.13 -0.02 0.15 0.46 0.49 0.08 -0.03 0.82 0.25 
Other Asia-Pacific 20.19 2.04 0.10 -0.83 -1.52 4.93 0.15 0.19 4.92 10.04 
Australia-NZ 1.37 -0.76 0.03 -0.03 0.58 0.29 0.27 -0.03 0.82 0.13 
South Africa 6.04 -0.36 -0.05 3.02 0.26 1.62 0.15 0.09 0.38 1.02 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.79 -0.75 -0.06 2.67 0.18 2.73 0.34 0.04 0.29 1.47 
Rest of World 3.94 -0.40 -0.04 -0.02 0.18 0.38 0.12 -0.01 0.34 0.11 
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Table A18 Full Liberalization (increasing returns to scale)       
Static Change in Unskilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 2.55 0.71 -0.08 -0.12 0.53 0.60 0.10 0.05 0.64 0.17 
France 1.83 0.71 -0.05 -0.24 0.18 0.48 0.80 0.00 0.18 0.06 
Germany 1.87 0.97 -0.04 -0.21 0.11 0.39 0.44 -0.02 0.20 0.06 
Rest of EU 15 1.51 0.76 -0.08 -0.13 0.21 0.41 0.05 -0.01 0.29 0.08 
CEECs -0.70 1.61 -0.34 -0.27 -1.77 -0.56 0.15 -0.04 0.02 -0.10 
Mediterranean 8.92 -0.36 -0.20 7.22 0.49 0.50 0.19 0.03 0.36 0.52 
North America 1.00 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.39 0.28 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.07 
South America 0.66 -0.64 -0.08 0.41 0.04 0.42 0.09 0.19 0.02 0.23 
China 4.20 -0.49 -0.13 3.85 -0.56 0.75 0.05 0.19 0.13 0.48 
India 4.51 -0.43 -0.06 1.45 0.14 1.72 0.06 1.08 0.13 0.36 
High Income Asia 4.48 2.35 -0.10 0.02 0.49 0.75 0.14 0.01 0.63 0.11 
Other Asia-Pacific 7.91 -0.57 -0.09 2.31 2.15 2.60 0.50 -0.04 0.15 0.87 
Australia-NZ 2.22 0.16 -0.04 0.07 0.54 0.33 0.53 0.01 0.42 0.11 
South Africa 7.49 -0.47 -0.12 4.06 0.26 1.88 0.17 0.73 0.35 0.79 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 5.41 0.06 -0.11 2.27 0.01 2.02 0.29 0.02 0.23 0.68 
Rest of World 5.55 -0.49 -0.11 -0.02 0.11 0.46 0.22 0.03 0.33 0.12 
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Table A19 Full Liberalization (increasing returns to scale)       
Static Change in Skilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 1.94 0.66 0.00 -0.31 0.44 0.45 -0.01 0.08 0.64 0.12 
France 1.43 0.86 0.01 -0.35 0.21 0.41 0.41 0.02 0.23 0.07 
Germany 2.01 0.97 -0.02 -0.21 0.14 0.40 0.45 -0.01 0.25 0.07 
Rest of EU 15 1.78 0.82 -0.03 -0.18 0.26 0.43 0.12 0.03 0.36 0.09 
CEECs 11.13 1.55 -0.43 0.84 3.34 2.50 0.28 0.18 1.36 0.60 
Mediterranean 10.36 -0.80 -0.27 8.02 -0.08 1.66 0.55 0.13 0.09 0.97 
North America 1.46 0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.54 0.34 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.09 
South America 0.51 -0.86 -0.11 0.34 0.03 0.62 0.19 -0.08 0.02 0.40 
China 0.76 -1.09 -0.20 4.58 -2.23 -0.17 0.21 0.05 -0.20 0.09 
India 2.67 -0.71 -0.09 1.85 -0.03 1.35 0.20 -0.37 0.05 0.38 
High Income Asia 5.08 2.60 -0.10 0.12 0.76 0.58 0.13 0.01 0.71 0.16 
Other Asia-Pacific 8.25 -1.10 -0.16 3.08 0.07 3.51 0.73 0.14 0.28 1.60 
Australia-NZ 0.68 -0.80 -0.06 -0.20 0.53 0.40 0.16 0.04 0.46 0.11 
South Africa 6.52 -0.65 -0.14 4.02 0.29 2.24 0.32 -0.72 0.31 1.04 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 5.67 -2.17 -0.18 3.84 -0.06 2.62 0.67 0.08 0.03 0.99 
Rest of World 5.61 -0.99 -0.15 -0.11 0.06 0.58 0.28 0.06 0.28 0.15 
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Table A-20 Full Liberalization (increasing returns to scale)      
Long-Run Change in Unskilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 6.79 0.55 0.15 -0.22 0.42 1.88 0.28 0.13 2.32 1.23 
France 4.33 0.64 0.80 -0.18 0.21 1.00 1.35 -0.01 0.72 0.11 
Germany 3.64 0.83 0.13 -0.02 0.35 0.90 0.69 -0.04 0.64 0.09 
Rest of EU 15 2.95 0.59 0.37 -0.09 0.26 0.89 0.12 -0.04 0.75 0.14 
CEECs 23.11 0.81 0.16 4.18 7.50 5.05 0.72 0.02 2.36 -1.04 
Mediterranean 10.72 -0.43 -0.27 4.12 1.14 1.57 0.50 0.08 0.91 2.76 
North America 1.32 -0.48 0.05 0.19 0.11 1.11 0.27 -0.05 0.50 -0.13 
South America 5.31 -0.14 -0.04 0.68 0.34 1.81 0.13 0.64 0.35 1.49 
China -3.44 1.03 -0.09 -0.27 -2.20 -5.60 0.06 0.58 0.95 2.42 
India 17.60 1.42 0.22 -4.72 1.87 2.53 -0.11 8.99 2.00 4.68 
High Income Asia 5.75 1.53 -0.04 0.06 0.83 1.25 0.16 -0.01 1.51 0.34 
Other Asia-Pacific 30.04 3.58 0.30 -5.49 3.06 8.04 0.34 0.40 6.66 13.01 
Australia-NZ 4.14 -0.25 0.08 0.09 0.68 0.67 0.92 -0.03 1.60 0.22 
South Africa 11.60 -0.78 -0.17 3.79 0.76 3.74 0.17 1.65 0.76 1.82 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 15.00 0.08 -0.17 2.86 0.87 6.56 0.38 0.14 1.16 3.56 
Rest of World 6.18 -0.43 -0.11 0.10 0.35 0.84 0.18 -0.02 0.67 0.11 
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Table A-21  Full Liberalization (increasing returns to scale)      
Long-Run Change in Skilled Worker Wages (Percent Change Relative to CPI)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 6.07 0.51 0.21 -0.37 0.29 1.68 0.16 0.16 2.31 1.16 
France 3.77 0.78 0.85 -0.23 0.23 0.86 0.94 0.01 0.72 0.06 
Germany 3.78 0.82 0.15 0.00 0.39 0.91 0.70 -0.03 0.68 0.08 
Rest of EU 15 3.16 0.65 0.43 -0.11 0.30 0.90 0.18 -0.01 0.80 0.10 
CEECs 39.84 0.33 0.19 7.34 15.39 8.91 1.16 0.17 3.75 -1.91 
Mediterranean 11.75 -0.88 -0.36 4.71 0.55 2.73 0.87 0.16 0.54 3.18 
North America 1.70 -0.55 0.06 0.17 0.28 1.14 0.53 -0.05 0.51 -0.15 
South America 5.13 -0.35 -0.07 0.64 0.32 2.00 0.22 0.37 0.31 1.65 
China -7.48 0.63 -0.17 0.18 -3.72 -7.19 0.22 0.41 0.56 2.14 
India 13.57 0.92 0.13 -3.13 1.41 1.91 0.05 6.34 1.48 3.87 
High Income Asia 6.21 1.74 -0.04 0.24 1.09 1.11 0.14 -0.01 1.54 0.28 
Other Asia-Pacific 34.28 3.93 0.25 -6.47 0.13 10.50 0.34 0.69 8.23 16.56 
Australia-NZ 2.42 -1.24 0.05 -0.09 0.66 0.72 0.54 -0.03 1.59 0.10 
South Africa 10.68 -0.99 -0.19 3.77 0.81 4.18 0.32 0.16 0.71 2.07 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 14.48 -2.22 -0.28 4.82 0.69 6.89 0.73 0.12 0.73 3.55 
Rest of World 6.14 -0.94 -0.16 0.05 0.29 0.98 0.24 0.00 0.59 0.09 
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Table A-22  Swiss Formula (increasing returns to scale)      
Static National Income Effects, millions of dollars (based on equivalent variation)      
  TOTAL 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(domestic 
support) 
LCD 
agriculture 
liberalization 
(border 
measures) 
OECD 
manufactures 
tariffs 
LDC 
manufactures 
tariffs 
OECD 
services 
liberalization 
LDC services 
liberalization 
OECD trade 
faciitation 
LDC trade 
facilitation 
                      
Netherlands 3779 361 -16 661 28 562 395 111 1114 292 
France 10012 1676 2750 179 296 1468 1014 263 1862 328 
Germany 11917 2244 1111 206 446 1959 1907 166 2719 745 
Rest of EU 15 26185 5213 4595 168 1045 4229 1554 482 6462 1732 
CEECs 5943 1235 11 451 735 838 373 109 1030 365 
Mediterranean 28310 -766 -598 23040 423 172 1043 173 684 3665 
North America 35253 1049 2215 1198 2931 6089 6162 725 10767 3090 
South America 4969 142 -148 1555 119 -1679 668 1232 883 3526 
China -2331 289 -228 4512 -5767 -1915 -15 878 -109 533 
India 3462 -64 -7 1108 118 -1029 57 1947 332 878 
High Income Asia 55088 18735 -533 2317 4521 7243 1868 105 15177 3904 
Other Asia-Pacific 13767 1073 -85 2933 827 644 632 126 2205 5195 
Australia-NZ 2431 -469 76 63 352 282 711 25 1059 241 
South Africa 3724 -76 -41 1997 92 469 94 361 202 600 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 2796 -160 -93 1915 76 -149 151 31 170 858 
Rest of World 21129 -629 -184 332 665 1297 635 107 1704 555 
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Table A-23  Relative competitive positions of national economies, status quo = 100  
  Short run Long run 
  status quo 
partial 
liberalization, 
linear cuts 
partial 
liberalization, 
Swiss cuts 
full 
liberalization 
partial 
liberalization, 
linear cuts 
partial 
liberalization, 
Swiss cuts 
full 
liberalization 
Netherlands 100 100.55 100.48 100.84 100.78 100.79 101.47 
France 100 99.74 99.9 99.43 99.44 99.70 99.23 
Germany 100 99.93 100.04 99.42 99.36 99.52 98.96 
Rest of EU 15 100 99.99 100.03 99.79 99.69 99.80 99.63 
CEECs 100 99.27 99.17 101.99 105.78 107.25 107.70 
Mediterranean 100 99.03 99.28 98.6 100.39 100.47 99.39 
North America 100 99.39 99.54 98.97 98.89 99.09 98.21 
South America 100 98.31 99.03 96.5 98.71 99.36 97.61 
China 100 98.79 99.86 98.98 95.30 94.36 97.22 
India 100 99.03 98.45 97.62 104.24 102.62 103.77 
High Income Asia 100 102.01 101.19 103.29 101.84 101.34 102.65 
Other Asia-Pacific 100 102.35 101.72 105.05 108.07 106.39 111.90 
Australia-NZ 100 100.35 100.86 101.05 100.50 101.21 100.98 
South Africa 100 100.29 100.37 101.03 100.88 101.02 101.74 
Sub-Saharan Africa 100 98.24 98.37 98.48 100.28 100.46 101.55 
Rest of World 100 100.22 100.29 100.5 100.22 100.37 100.42 
note: based on real factor incomes earned in each economy    
 
